Zeran v. AOL 20th Anniversary Essays by The Recorder
20
Commemorating the 20th  
Anniversary of Internet  
Law’s Most Important  
Judicial Decision
Introducing a series of essays curated by  
Eric Goldman and Jeff Kosseff about the seminal 
internet law case Zeran v. AOL.
By Eric Goldman and Jeff Kosseff
November 10, 2017
M
any factors contributed to the Internet’s 
growth over the past 25 years, but we’d like to 
highlight an underappreciated catalyst. In 1996, 
Congress enacted a law, 47 U.S.C. §230, to 
immunize websites from liability for third-party 
content. Section 230 is an “Internet exceptionalist” law; 
Congress made the liability rules for online content dif-
ferent from, and more favorable than, the rules for offline 
content.
Section 230’s immunity from liability for third-party 
content has provided the foundation for the Internet we 
know today. Each of the top 10 U.S. websites relies heavily 
on third party content and, in turn, §230.
Editor’s Note: This is a collection of essays submitted 
by internet law scholars and attorneys about Section 230 
and the legacy of Zeran v. AOL. Continue scrolling down for 
links to the full articles.
However, the scope of §230’s immunity wasn’t neces-
sarily clear from Congress’ words, which are characteristi-
cally inscrutable. Instead, §230’s implications first became 
clear from the first appellate court opinion interpreting it, 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Zeran v. AOL.
The Zeran case involved a pernicious cyber-harassment 
attack. An unknown perpetrator posted inflammatory mes-
sages to AOL purporting to be from Zeran, which prompted 
outraged readers to bombard Zeran with angry phone calls. 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that §230 protected AOL from 
liability for publishing the inflammatory messages.
The Zeran case interpreted §230 quite broadly, provid-
ing liability immunity even when online publishers exercise 
editorial control over third party content, and even when 
the online publisher fails to respond to takedown notices. 
Due to its timing and its breadth, the Zeran opinion had an 
enormous influence on subsequent courts’ interpretations 
of §230, leading them to apply the statutory immunity 
expansively across a wide range of circumstances.
Together, §230 and the Zeran ruling helped create a 
trillion-dollar industry centered around user-generated 
content. Because of its influence on such a key issue, the 
Zeran ruling is widely considered the most important Inter-
net Law ruling ever.
It is also a controversial opinion, and debates about the 
ruling’s conclusion and implications continue to this day. 
Indeed, Congress is currently considering making its first 
major substantive reduction to §230’s immunity, and much 
of the debate over these proposals revisits the mid-1990s’ 
policy debates over how best to reduce anti-social behavior 
online. Despite the passage of time and evolution of tech-
nology, the underlying policy questions remain as fresh 
and important as they were two decades ago.
Zeran was decided 20 years ago-on Nov. 12, 1997. To 
commemorate this anniversary, we asked nearly two dozen 
experts in Internet Law to share their thoughts about the 
case. We invited authors with normative views that span the 
§230 debate, so the group of authors includes both fans and 
opponents of the Zeran ruling and §230 generally.
Their essays generally fit into two categories. Some 
essays take a historical approach, explaining how we got 
§230 or the Zeran ruling. The other essays discuss the 
legacy and impact of the Zeran ruling over the past two de-
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cades, some enthusiastically celebrating the developments 
and others issuing stinging criticisms and calls for reform.
We learned a lot from this collection of essays, and we 
hope you will too.
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In January 1996, shortly after it was enacted, I wrote one of 
the first articles on the Good Samaritan exemption created 
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. §230(c)—
popularly referred to as the Communications Decency 
Act or CDA), correctly arguing that it preempted claims 
against interactive computer service providers and users, 
not merely for defamation, but for a broad array of claims. 
I did not, however, envision that subsection 230(c)(1) would 
be construed as broadly as it has been over the past two 
decades, or that subsection 230(c)(2) would be applied as 
infrequently. Indeed, when the district court and then the 
circuit court decided Zeran v. AOL, I was critical of their an-
alytic approach, as some may remember from early articles 
in The Cyberspace Lawyer.
The law, however, is written by courts, not commentators, 
and the rule of Zeran has been uniformly applied by every 
federal circuit court to consider it and by numerous state 
courts. And it has never been rejected in any precedential 
opinion. Indeed, it is perhaps a fitting tribute to the viability 
of Zeran that 20 year later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in its 12th opinion construing the CDA, barely 
spent even a sentence affirming dismissal of a defamation 
claim brought against Facebook over user content, pursuant 
to the CDA and the rule first developed in Zeran. See Caracci-
oli v. Facebook., _ F. App’x _, 2017 WL 2445063 (9th Cir. 2017).
The broad preclusive effect of the CDA recognized by 
Zeran has been extended beyond mere defamation cases to 
an array of disputes where third parties seek to hold Internet 
sites or mobile app providers liable for the misconduct of 
users. Because conduct online takes the form of content—as 
users act through key strokes, smart phone virtual buttons 
and emoji— the CDA has been applied where conduct ulti-
mately is premised on user content. Thus, for example, courts 
have held that the CDA preempts claims by parents against 
Internet sites and services where children have met adults 
who then allegedly abused them, by the widows of personnel 
killed by ISIS, and by victims of sex traffickers against publish-
ers of online classified ads that led to their victimization. It 
has also been held to preempt claims by a tort victim against 
the Internet service where the plaintiff’s assailant had al-
legedly purchased the gun used against him, against a social 
network for failing to promptly remove a profile that allegedly 
led to violence, for failing to act to prevent statements made 
in a chatroom, and for strict product liability and related 
claims brought against eBay for transactions between users 
of its platform. See Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce & Internet Law: 
Treatise with Forms 2d ed. §37.05[1][C] (enumerating cases).
There are, however, differing approaches to how the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Zeran v. 
AOL is applied in different circuits.
Most circuits construe the CDA broadly, consistent with 
Zeran. See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24 
(1st Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of claims for civil remedies 
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, 
18 U.S.C.A. §1595, and Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking 
and Victim Protection Act of 2010, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 
§50); Obado v. Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90, 91-94 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(affirming dismissal for failure to state claims for defamation, 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
invasion of privacy against various service providers, search 
engines and domain name registrars for republishing and 
allegedly manipulating search engine results to maximize the 
impact of allegedly defamatory content, based on the CDA); 
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Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
the assertion that MySpace could be held liable for failing to 
implement measures that allegedly would have prevented 
a minor from being contacted by a predator, and stating 
that these “allegations are merely another way of claiming 
that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications 
and they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online 
third-party-generated content.”); Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(vacating and reversing a jury award for the plaintiff over 
highly offensive comments posted on a gossip website); 
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. 
v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming 
dismissal of a Fair Housing Act claim).
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair 
Housing Council v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2008) (en banc), broadly construed what constitutes de-
velopment, which could strip away CDA protection for an 
interactive content provider by treating it as an information 
content provider for user content in narrow circumstances 
where the site is deemed to have developed the user con-
tent. While this interpretation ultimately is narrow, clever 
plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit try to plead around the CDA 
by alleging development in the hope of moving a claim past 
motion practice to discovery.
The Ninth Circuit also has recognized a number of 
fact-specific, narrow exceptions to the CDA that have not 
been recognized by other circuits. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a service 
could be sued for failing to warn of a dangerous user of its 
site, but only to the extent the provider’s knowledge was 
acquired offline); Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that a provider could be sued for promissory 
estoppel if it voluntarily undertook to do something that 
the CDA otherwise would not require, such as removing 
user content); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(carving out a narrow exception when a communication 
republished by a defendant was not originally intended for 
publication).
Courts also have taken differing approaches to the 
question of what constitutes a claim pertaining to intel-
lectual property, within the meaning of section 230(e)(2), 
which creates an exclusion to the otherwise broad preemp-
tion provisons set forth in sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2). 
Compare Perfect 10  v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the CDA preempted a state right of publicity 
claim) with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 
288, 298-304 (D.N.H. 2008) (disagreeing with Perfect 10 
and holding that the CDA did not preempt plaintiff’s right of 
publicity claim); and Atlantic Recording  v. Project Playlist, 
603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (construing the 
literal language of the statute the same way as the court in 
Doe and declining to dismiss plaintiff’s common law copy-
right claim).
Depending where a party is sued, these differences can 
impact whether CDA immunity is determined early, and 
relatively inexpensively. The Fourth Circuit, which decided 
Zeran, observed 12 years later that CDA “‘immunity is an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’ 
and ‘it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to 
go to trial’ ….” Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 
F.3d 250, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Excep-
tions to and variations in the way the CDA is construed in 
different circuits, even if narrow, ultimately impact whether 
the immunity afforded by the CDA can be quickly vindicated 
or whether, in a given case, it may be lost—or at least dilut-
ed—through protracted litigation.
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he modern legal dialectic around the First 
Amendment is harsh and dauntingly complicat-
ed. The prevailing topical U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence values free speech because it 
can contribute to human meaning-making and 
construction of selfhood, and has the potential to produce 
the sorts of ideas and information that can lead to human 
enlightenment. The court also deeply distrusts govern-
mental regulation of speech, and has articulated powerful 
doubts about the government’s ability to competently 
balance social costs and benefits pertaining to speech, 
especially when driven by censorial motives. Actual living 
human beings and their emotions do not much factor into 
either the court’s positive or negative justifications for free 
speech. See generally Toni Massaro, Helen Norton and Mar-
got Kaminski, “SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence 
Reveals about the First Amendment,” 101 Minnesota Law 
Review 2481 (2017).
Section 230 takes this free speech-rooted disregard 
for people and their feelings, and ramps it up a few notch-
es, immunizing online media companies from liability for 
hosting not only anything the First Amendment protects, 
but also from the reach of most of the very limited speech 
restrictions that First Amendment jurisprudence disdain-
fully tolerates.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can host maliciously 
defamatory speech that would not be protected by the 
First Amendment. They can host threats of violence that 
are   outside the First Amendment.  They can host obscen-
ity as long as it is not comprised of child pornography, and 
they can host panic-inducing online equivalents of shouts 
of “Fire!” in crowded theaters without fearing civil suit or 
arrest, as long as no federal crime is committed.
As it happens, defamatory speech, threats and obscen-
ity almost never rise to the level of federal crimes.   Ac-
cording to one legal scholar, “it is now generally accepted 
that the First Amendment forbids criminal penalties for 
defamation.” Actionable threats must be “true threats” 
and require a higher level of culpability than negligence; 
it is not clear that   even a showing of recklessness would 
be adequate.  And the federal government has   only rarely 
pursued obscenity charges for content that did not involve 
or depict children since 1988. Even when completely out-
side the protections of the First Amendment, almost any 
speech can be hosted on a wholly for-profit basis, featuring 
paid advertisements or charging subscription fees, without 
fear of legal responsibility.
Section 230   asks nothing in return for this extensive 
ISP immunity. The ISPs can’t be forced to remove offending 
content unless it fits within what are mostly very narrow 
exceptions, as demonstrated by   twenty years of litigation. 
The only broadly interpreted immunity exception is for 
intellectual property, which §230 actually cares about be-
cause it is rooted in money and commerce and intangible 
“property” rather than people and their messy and seem-
ingly inconsequential emotions.
ISPs don’t have to keep track of who posts what, or 
identify any person doing the offensive posting unless they 
want to, or choose to comply with an appropriately draft-
ed and served subpoena, meaning legal representation is 
generally necessary to successfully identify the source of 
harmful speech.
Section 230 has therefore made hosting defamation, 
threats and exhortations that lead to panic or violence into 
a lucrative online business models.  Twenty years ago, AOL   
strategically ignored Ken Zeran’s horrific victimization by 
an anonymous internet hoaxer.
Today, acts of online harassment directed at contem-
porary Ken Zerans are more likely to fill the enormous 
coffers of companies like Google, Facebook, Twitter, GoDad-
dy and Reddit. The platforms may change over time but 
the basic framework remains the same. Eyeball attraction 
generates demand for online services such as web hosting, 
cloud computing, advertising, data analytics, storage, and 
domain name registration.
Hatred can be very profitable. Research   conducted by 
Zeran The Recorder presents a series of essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of Zeran v. AOL.   AOL
This article first appeared in the November 10, 2017 issue of The Recorder.
ProPublica “surveyed the most visited websites of groups 
designated as extremist by either the SPLC or the An-
ti-Defamation League ... [and] found that more than half 
of them-39 out of 69-made money from ads, donations or 
other revenue streams facilitated by technology compa-
nies.   At least 10 tech companies played a role directly or 
indirectly in supporting these sites.” ProPublica further 
found that: “PayPal, the payment processor, has a policy 
against working with sites that use its service for “the 
promotion of hate, violence, [or] racial intolerance.” Yet 
it was by far the top tech provider to the hate sites with 
donation links on 23 sites, or about one-third of those   
surveyed by ProPublica.”
A recent Pew Research Center survey   found that 
41% of adult Americans “have been personally subjected 
to harassing behavior online, and an even larger share 
(66%) has witnessed these behaviors directed at others. 
... [N]early one-in-five Americans (18%) have been sub-
jected to particularly severe forms of harassment online, 
such as physical threats, harassment over a sustained pe-
riod, sexual harassment or stalking.” A full 58% of those 
who have been harassed online said it happened via social 
media, while for 23% their “most recent” harassment ex-
perience occurred in the comments sections of a website; 
for 15% the harassment occurred   via a text or messaging 
app. Occasionally, ISPs will help out individual harassment 
victims. But they are not required to do so, and usually 
they will not.
A few large social media platforms are voluntari-
ly   addressing some online harassment campaigns to 
appease advertisers and large, well organized interest 
groups, with intermediations that focus on hate speech 
targeted at groups that share common characteristics 
such as race, gender, sexual orientation, political beliefs or 
religion.  Some affected individuals see such interventions 
as inadequate, while other people see them as censorious 
threats to freedom of expression online. The companies 
that own these platforms are much more likely base their 
strategies for addressing online harassment on what is 
most profitable than striving to carefully balance priva-
cy, safety, and speech interests. Section 230 endorses 
an approach to speech that is entirely driven by money.  
The online media companies that rein in threats and hate 
speech on their platforms in turn create profitable oppor-
tunities for the emergence of new social media platforms 
on which anything goes.
Even with a strong commitment to expansive free 
speech principles, a sense of decency and fair play should 
make one question the legitimacy of §230 as currently 
written and interpreted. Manufacturers, food producers, 
and companies in the service industries have to take 
responsibility for goods, no matter how large the compa-
ny or how prodigious its output.  But gigantic, fabulously 
wealthy companies like Facebook, Google and Twitter do 
not have to take any responsibility for the harms caused 
by the online platforms they own, control and profit from. 
Section 230 means that companies are allowed to facili-
tate or ignore speech-ignited harms they absolutely have 
the right and ability to control, as long as someone else is 
the speaker.
Some people   tout §230 as the law that created the 
Internet. But given the willingness of social media, e-com-
merce, Internet search and web hosting businesses to do 
business in nations that lack laws anything like §230, his-
trionic claims that without §230 successful and creative 
online companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter would 
not exist or could not thrive are unsupportable.
As I have   argued before ISPs would still be profitable 
even if they were required to affirmatively mitigate the 
most severe of the harms that result from some portion 
of the online speech they host. China has one of the   
most highly censored Internets in the world, and it still 
has highly innovative and extremely profitable Internet 
companies.  This is not at all, in any regard, a suggestion 
that the United States should follow China’s example with 
respect to Internet regulation. It is simply to note that 
China has high levels of both censorship and innovation 
simultaneously, and remains a desirable market for U.S. 
companies despite the intensive censorship. Chinese 
social media company Tencent is the second largest in 
the world, second only to Facebook, and both Tencent and 
its Chinese social media competitor NetEase are   larger   
and   more profitable than Twitter. And Facebook, current-
ly blocked by the Great Firewall of China, is still trying to 
find its way back into the Chinese market,   using innova-
tive approaches. So is   Google.
Germany has recently   instituted a law against hate 
speech that will require ISPs to police their own platforms. 
This law applies to social media sites with more than two 
million users in Germany. Other European Union members  
may do   the same. But no large Internet company has 
yet suggested it will retreat from the German Internet or 
from the European Union generally. Again, this is not an 
endorsement of Germany’s approach. It is simply offered 
as further evidence that the absence of §230 style ISP im-
munity does not dissuade large Internet companies from 
participation or profit seeking.
In the United States, as long as §230 remains in place 
and unchanged, the only options for badly victimized 
parties are to engage potentially costly lawyers who may 
not be able to help them, or to employ expensive and 
potentially unsavory reputation defense companies that 
have few if any effective   tools to offer. Thoughtfully carv-
ing out a few more exceptions to §230 aimed at reducing 
serious online harassment will not break the Internet.  
  Ann Bartow is a professor of law at University of New Hamp-
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he Internet has emerged over the last two 
decades as the dominant medium of electronic 
communication, commerce, and speech in the 
world.
In the United States and other western democ-
racies, this decentralized, no-gatekeeper network of networks 
allows billions to connect and communicate with each other 
and the world both individually and through intermediaries 
like AOL in the early days and Facebook and Twitter today. It 
is a medium of communication like no other. It allows anyone 
and everyone with a computer and Internet connection to 
publish and speak.
When we celebrate the Internet, we most often focus on 
the genius of the technology and the innovative technolo-
gists, the “Wizards who Stayed Up Late,” the creators of the 
World Wide Web, devices like the IPhone and incredible social 
applications like Google and Facebook. And we should!
However, what the Zeran case reminds us is that the 
Internet could not become what it is today without a “policy 
architecture” that facilitates a no-gatekeeper technology. 
Zeran, upholding §230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), embeds in law that Internet ISPs can connect millions 
of users without the burden of liability for the speech en-
gaged in by those speakers.
ISPs may publish and post but only the speaker is lia-
ble for his or her speech, such as the arguably defamatory 
speech posted on AOL and directed at Zeran. And no liability 
meant no gatekeepers. And the shield of Zeran has stood up 
to protect ISPs from legal liability for a variety of objection-
able speech published on the Internet.
Without §230 of the CDA, or some legal regime akin to 
it, the potential of the Internet would have been stifled. AOL 
and other intermediaries would have been forced to do the 
impossible: review and edit postings in advance, hire a squad 
of lawyers to limit postings, and defend a myriad of lawsuits. 
Large and well-financed operators could operate, but speech 
would be limited and new applications might never have 
emerged if required to finance costly legal overhead to do 
business on the Internet. It is almost impossible to imagine 
the rise of Facebook or Twitter without the “breathing room” 
afforded by §230.
It is important in this context to emphasize that §230 was 
not a foregone outcome of the legislative and legal battle 
from which it emerged. I was one of the leaders of the Inter-
active Working Group (IWG), an ad-hoc non-partisan coalition 
of industry and advocacy organizations formed to oppose 
the CDA. The IWG included companies, industry associations, 
and advocacy organizations that included a diversity of the 
communications and emerging Internet industry and advoca-
cy organizations, both liberal and conservative.
I believe it is instructive to consider how IWG worked to 
bring about §230. The lessons learned are particularly im-
portant today in the face of mounting calls by legislators and 
states attorney generals to revisit and revise §230 to limit the 
liability shield of intermediaries to counter a growing list of 
harms including sex trafficking, cyber bullying, hate speech, 
fake news, and incitement to terrorism and violence.
In 1995 the CDA was proposed to address pornography 
on the Internet. The solution was simple: extend the indecen-
cy rules governing mass media radio and television to the 
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Internet.
As the CDA, sponsored by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.) 
moved through the Senate (hereinafter EXON CDA), the 
IWG faced an uphill battle. We decided to educate lawmak-
ers that the Internet was fundamentally different in archi-
tecture and operation. The IWG worked to educate policy 
makers about the nature of the new technology and fo-
cused their attention on user empowerment blocking tools 
to empower users to control what was available on their 
computers to meet their own choices and protect children. 
We made the case that this was the only effective, and least 
restrictive, constitutional way to address objectionable 
speech in this new medium.
The IWG also sought persuade Congress to support 
a Sen. Patrick Leahy’s (D-VT) proposal (S. 714, the Child 
Protection, User Empowerment, and Free Expression in 
Interactive Media Study Bill, April 1995) to “study” the new 
medium.
However, Congress has never met a pornography pro-
posal it did not embrace. Indeed, regulating pornography 
was a particular promise in the Republican “Contract with 
America” that Republicans used to frame the 1994 elec-
tion, and it resulted in Republicans getting control of the 
House and Newt Gingrich the speakership. Thus, despite our 
efforts, the Exon CDA passed the Senate in June 1995. (For 
more background on the CDA, see Robert Cannon, The Leg-
islative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency 
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhigh-
way).
In the House, the IWG moved in a different direction. We 
persuaded the House Speaker to declare Exxon unconstitu-
tional. On June 20, 1995, Newt Gingrich put out the follow-
ing statement
I think that the Amendment you referred to by Senator 
Exon in the Senate will have no real meaning and have no 
real impact and in fact I don’t think will survive. It is clearly 
a violation of free speech and it’s a violation of the right of 
adults to communicate with each other. I don’t agree with 
it and I don’t think it is a serious way to discuss a serious 
issue, which is, how do you maintain the right of free speech 
for adults while also protecting children in a medium that 
is available to both? That’s also frankly a problem with tele-
vision and radio, and it’s something that we have to wres-
tle with in a calm and mature way as a society. I think by 
offering a very badly thought out and not very productive 
amendment, if anything, that put the debate back a step.
Under that cover, IWG worked with Reps. Chris Cox (R-
CA) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) to propose alternative legisla-
tion, H.R. 1978, the Internet Freedom and Family Empower-
ment Act, June 30, 1995 (hereinafter Cox-Wyden). IWG put 
together a study published by the Center for Democracy 
and Technology called Parental Empowerment, Child Pro-
tection and Free Speech in Interactive Media. Jerry Berman 
and Danny Weitzner of CDT, Jill Lesser of People for the 
American Way, and the late Ron Plesser of Piper and Mar-
bury, wrote the study. The study recommended a non-reg-
ulatory approach along the lines of §230. As Sen. Leahy 
acknowledged, the IWG study became the policy framework 
for Cox-Wyden and §230.
Cox-Wyden passed the House as a freestanding amend-
ment to the main Telecommunications Act then before the 
Congress in response to the Exxon CDA. Essentially, the 
House (by an overwhelming vote) took a wholly different 
approach to the problem of objectionable speech than the 
Senate.
Heading into conference, pressure from family groups 
supporting the Exon CDA mounted; and neither Wyden nor 
Cox was appointed as conferees. But our coalition put up 
enough of a fight to persuade the conferees to adopt all of 
§230. The provision, as opposed to the creation of a “Fed-
eral Computer Commission,” nevertheless remained in the 
final CDA section of the Telecommunications Act to shield 
intermediaries from legal liability for defamation and other 
forms of objectionable speech or “Good Samaritan” efforts 
to protect and empower users against such speech. For 
more on this, see the panel discussion featuring Sen. Ron 
Wyden, Jerry Berman, Danny Weitzner and others on the 
Statute that Saved the Internet in 2013, celebrating §230 on 
its 15th Anniversary.
The subsequent court battle resulted in a Supreme 
Court decision striking down the Exon CDA as violating the 
First Amendment, but also upholding as constitutional both 
the findings and operative provisions of §230. While we 
know the case as ACLU v Reno as the ACLU was the first to 
file a challenge to the law in court, the Circuit and Supreme 
Court adopted the reasoning of a second challenge to the 
CDA.
After the ACLU filed, three members of the IWG (CDT, 
AOL, and the American Library Association) organized a 
second challenge to the CDA, American Library Association 
v. Reno (hereinafter the ALA case), that was consolidated 
with the ACLU challenge. For the inside story of these chal-
lenges, see Kara Swisher, AOL.COM.
In court, ALA lawyers presented the case and focused 
on the nature of the technology. They argued that in this 
vast sea of content, the CDA violated the First Amendment 
because the most effective and least restrictive means for 
addressing objectionable content was to empower users to 
choose what content to access themselves. Adopting this 
rationale to strike down the Exon CDA but leaving §230 in 
place, the decision transformed the Communications Decen-
cy Act into the “Communications Freedom Act.”
The lesson going forward is that a legal challenge was 
not enough to address the threat to the Internet. It required 
the presentation of an alternative solution that could prevail 
in Congress and pass muster in the courts. See John B. Mor-
ris, Jr and Cynthia M. Wong, Revisiting User Control: The 
Emergence and Success of a First Amendment Theory for 
the Internet Age. To achieve this result, defenders of the In-
ternet had to engage in legislation and litigation and devise 
practical effective policy alternatives and solutions.
Today, pressure is mounting to enact exceptions to 
§230. Civil liberties groups are making the case in litigation 
that exceptions that expose intermediaries to broad liability 
would fundamentally shift the Internet to a gatekeeper re-
gime. But even if the 230 defense holds, there are problems 
to resolve that involve new policy initiatives in forums other 
than the courts.
Ironically, the Good Samaritan provisions that exempt 
intermediaries from liability for taking steps to limit “ob-
jectionable speech” could begin to have unintended nega-
tive impacts on speech if ISPs bow to pressure and censor 
hate speech or fake news and other forms of controversial 
speech under the “Good Samaritan” protection of §230 that 
shields them from liability for doing so. The drafters of §230 
at the time envisioned an Internet of many ISPs competing 
for customers and providing such a wide range of speech 
platforms that censorship would be minimized. And this has 
worked well.
But today, with few ISPs exercising huge network effects 
(like Facebook that serves over 2 billion users), “Good Sa-
maritan” speech limitations, however well intentioned, might 
curtail the ability of all to speak and access information be-
cause few entities control the platforms. This, in turn, might 
create pressure for government to regulate content deci-
sions by intermediaries for or against one form of speech or 
another.
To address these new speech issues, we need a new 
Interactive Working Group coalition to oppose unwise 
tampering with §230 but who work together to flesh out 
and propose workable solutions and best practices to foster 
Internet industry self-government. If “intermediaries” like 
Backpage are in fact producing the content advertised on a 
site, lawmakers could find a solution that treated such a pro-
vider as a content producer outside the intermediary liability 
protection of §230. And if intermediaries take steps to limit 
content, they should be working together to develop “best 
practices and standards” to control objectionable speech 
without harming the First Amendment. Without workable 
private sector alternatives, the government may step in and 
pass legislation that would pass constitutional muster but 
hamper an open Internet.
The Internet was not born free. It was made free and will 
only remain free if a concerted effort is made to keep it free.
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Sex, Scandal and 
Intermediary Liability: 
Imagining Life Without 
‘Zeran v. AOL’
The Bazee.com legal saga highlights what could 
happen without a strong third-party liability 
protection standard for Internet businesses.
By Hillary Brill
A
s I was settling into my role as eBay’s first Leg-
islative Counsel, my office received an urgent 
call from CEO Meg Whitman requesting help 
with the India Situation, a.k.a. “Operation Save 
Avi!”
It was 2004 and Avnish Bajaj, American citizen and Har-
vard Business school graduate, was head of eBay subsidiary 
Bazee.com. Up for auction, without his knowledge, was a link 
to a video clip of New Delhi students having oral sex. The 
seller, a different student, listed the item for a little under $3. 
The clip was never sold and was never shown. Avi had nothing 
to do with the video and never even viewed it.
The illicit item was immediately taken down by Bazee.
com upon notification of its pornographic content. The end 
user license agreement prohibited pornography and Bazee.
com acted accordingly. The company, and Avi personally, fully 
cooperated with all legal proceedings and complied with all 
requests by the Indian government. Despite his cooperation, 
Avi personally was arrested and charged with violating India’s 
Information Technology Act of 2000.
Under the act, Avi faced up to five years in prison and 
thousands of dollars in fines. Specifically, §67 establishes 
liability for anyone who “publishes or transmits or causes to 
be published or transmitted material in any electronic form 
which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or 
conduct,” even without knowledge or intent. Moreover, §85 of 
the act imposes liability not only on the person who engaged 
in the violation of the act but also on the person in charge of 
and responsible to the company.
Avi’s arrest caused an uproar in the U.S. government. 
Members of Congress became involved and then Secretary 
of State Condoleeza Rice called on the Indian government to 
ensure Avi’s safety and to grant him a fair trial. The U.S. em-
bassy submitted a statement indicating that there was a high 
level of interest in the U.S. government regarding the case. 
While eBay’s government relations team felt like we were 
doing our best to save Avi, it was almost Christmas Eve and 
Avi was sleeping on the floor of a jammed prison cell merely 
because of third-party content posted on an eBay site. For my 
team in Washington, it was unfathomable and terrifying.
Fortunately, cooler heads eventually prevailed, and soon 
after Avi was released and charges were dropped. But the 
Bazee.com legal saga highlights what could happen without 
a strong third-party liability protection standard for Internet 
businesses. Avi’s case is a real-world example where limited 
liability protections in §230 of the CDA did not exist. A petri 
dish scenario where we can observe what could happen 
if there were not protections–like those established in the 
seminal limited liability decision Zeran v. AOL–for intermediar-
ies like Avi and Bazee.com from liability based on third-party 
content.
In the United States, however, these liability protections 
are in place and are the cornerstone of the modern day 
internet and an enabler of the burgeoning Internet of Things 
(IoT). Without the protections of §230, nascent e-commerce 
companies like eBay or Amazon might not have grown into 
thriving enterprises, and might not have survived at all. News 
of a CEO thrown into U.S. prison because of something un-
knowingly listed on a site (not even sold) could have poten-
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tially brought e-commerce to a standstill.
In India, the impact of the Bazee.com case led to an 
appeal by industry to amend the Information Technology 
Act of 2000 to provide liability protection to intermediaries 
with respect to user-generated content. It took eight more 
years for India to begin to implement a better system to 
protect intermediaries from liability. In 2008, an amend-
ment to §79 of the Information Technology Act created a 
new standard of limited liability: “an intermediary shall not 
be liable for any third party information, data, or communi-
cation link made available or hosted by him” and requires 
“actual knowledge.” Additionally, it established a new notice 
and take down regime with safe harbor provisions modeled 
after the EU Directive 2000/31 and similar U.S. laws such as 
§230 of the CDA and 17 USC § 512.
Even under this amended law, however, intermediary 
liability protections in India remained limited compared to 
the U.S. This proved true in Google India v. Visaka Indus-
tries, which involved a defamation lawsuit against Google 
for not taking down alleged defamatory third-party blog 
posts railing against the evils of an asbestos company. 
Google argued for third party immunity under §79 of 
India’s amended Information Technology Act 2000. The 
Indian court refused to drop the defamation charges 
against Google holding that Google failed to take any 
steps to block or stop the dissemination of the defamato-
ry material despite receiving notice.
In essence, the Indian court took the opposite approach 
from the U.S. court in Zeran. Whereas Zeran construed 
§230 broadly to bar lawsuits seeking to hold an intermedi-
ary liable for objectionable third-party content, the court in 
the Google India case construed protections narrowly, such 
that an intermediary may be held liable if it had knowledge 
of allegedly defamatory content and failed to take it down, 
notwithstanding the absence of any judicial finding of defa-
mation.
While the Google India case is still on appeal, a landmark 
decision in 2015 may increase Google India’s prospects and 
suggests third-party liability protections are broadening. In 
Singhal v. Union of India several liability-imposing provisions 
of the Information Technology Act were held unconstitu-
tional. Singhal involved the arrest of two women using so-
cial media to criticize local government. The court absolved 
them of liability and struck down §66A of the Information 
Technology Act because it imposed criminal liability based 
on an unduly vague legal standard. Moreover, the court 
examined §79 (at issue in the Google India case), and, while 
it declined to strike down the measure, it held that liabil-
ity may be imposed under the statute only if an Internet 
company refuses to take down objectionable material after 
a court orders it to do so.
Echoing the reasoning of Zeran, the Singhai court held 
that “it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Goo-
gle, Facebook etc. to act [pre-emptively] when millions of 
requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as 
to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not.” 
The Singhai case is a testament to just how far India has 
come since the “Save Avi” days.
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of AOL v. Zeran, 
let us reaffirm that intermediary liability protections should 
remain strong to encourage innovation and promote a thriv-
ing civil society both in the United States and worldwide. 
Otherwise, another young legislative counsel may have to 
save another Avi one day soon.
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How the Scam Artists at 
Stratton Oakmont Made 
‘Zeran’ Possible and 
Unwittingly Saved the 
Internet
 
It would be fair to say that this hugely favorable 
result likely would never have come to pass 
without an earlier court decision involving the 
Stratton Oakmont brokerage firm, infamously 
memorialized in the movie “The Wolf of Wall 
Street.”
 
By Robert J. Butler 
I
n Zeran v. America Online, the Fourth Circuit upheld 
the broad grant of immunity for interactive service 
providers set out in §230 of the Communications Act, 
47 U.S.C. §230. The court found that the new statute 
established a clear Congressional intent to exempt the 
emerging online industry from the threat of liability for 
information posted by others on their networks or trans-
mitted over and through them. Obviously, this decision was 
very gratifying to the industry, and especially to those of us 
who had spent many months crafting and negotiating that 
legislation. It would be fair to say, however, that this hugely 
favorable result likely would never have come to pass with-
out an earlier court decision involving the Stratton Oak-
mont brokerage firm, infamously memorialized in the movie 
“The Wolf of Wall Street.”
The complex legal and political issues that ultimately gen-
erated §230 as it was reviewed in Zeran had their genesis in a 
Senator’s desire to protect kids from pornography and other 
objectionable materials available on this new technological 
medium called the Internet, and a New York court that found 
Prodigy Services Company, one of the preeminent online 
pioneers, liable for millions of dollars because it tried to do 
just that. Given the obvious disconnect between those per-
spectives, the path to a resolution that could protect Prodigy 
and the rest of the online industry from potentially crippling 
liabilities was both far from clear and littered with proverbial 
minefields. How we got from those early existential threats to 
Zeran is an interesting exercise in legislative craftsmanship 
and political theater, with a substantial dose of legal irony.
In brief, it all started with the Exon Amendment to §223 
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §223, as amended. [A 
comprehensive early legislative history of this provision can 
be found here.] Senator James Exon of Nebraska proposed to 
update existing prohibitions in the Act related to obscene and 
other objectionable materials and activities using a telephone 
to include the new online medium. At virtually the same time, 
Prodigy Services Company was fighting a lawsuit filed by the 
Stratton Oakmont financial firm over allegedly defamatory 
comments posted on a Prodigy bulletin board by some of 
its users. Stratton Oakmont successfully argued that, since 
Prodigy screened its postings for profanity, it could not take 
advantage of the historical distributor/conduit immunity that 
had saved an online rival from liability in a similar case, Cubby 
v. Compuserve. As Washington counsel for Prodigy, I was 
tasked to work with Senator Exon’s staff to address both of 
these potentially devastating developments.
As originally introduced in 1994, Senator Exon’s amend-
ment proposed simply to change references in §223 from 
“telephone” to “telecommunications device” and to add 
“communication” to “conversation” in order to accommodate 
“changing technologies.” The challenge facing the industry 
was to convince the Senator and others not to throw out the 
Internet baby with the “dirty” bath water of Internet porn. 
It would be impossible for online services to screen and 
block access to all prohibited material, especially when such 
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activities would expose them to inordinate liabilities for the 
millions of other postings on their services. Unfortunately, 
that debate would have to be held against the backdrop of a 
Congress that had never seen anti-pornography legislation 
that it didn’t support. The Stratton Oakmont case, which 
was subsequently settled, provided the leverage to make a 
skeptical Congress receptive to the industry’s need for pro-
tections so that it could act responsibly in the ever evolving 
Internet environment.
After months of discussions with the online industry and 
other interest groups, Senator Exon agreed to add language 
to his Communications Decency Act (CDA) that disclaimed 
the Stratton Oakmont precedent, which would otherwise 
deter online actors from implementing his desired restric-
tions. See Report 104-23, 104th Cong., 1st Session (March 
30, 1995). As further revised and adopted in conference as 
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the expanded 
statutory language prohibited, in relevant part, the use of 
an interactive computer service to make indecent content 
available to minors absent the implementation of good faith 
restrictions on their access. However, it also ensured that 
online services would not be held liable for merely providing 
access (including incidental functionality such as browsers 
and search engines) to prohibited materials so long as they 
were not complicit in the creation, knowing distribution or 
advertising of those materials. 47 U.S.C. §§223(e)(1)-(3). 
This language was essential to recognize and protect the 
role of these new technologies in the expanding Internet 
space.
Moreover, while establishing the good faith provision 
of blocking and screening of children’s access to restrict-
ed content as a defense to liability, 47 U.S.C. §(e)(5), the 
Conference Committee version likewise expressly rejected 
Stratton Oakmont by: (1) declaring that no actions could 
be brought “against any person on account of any [lawful] 
activity … taken in good faith” to restrict access to prohibit-
ed content, 47 U.S.C. §223(f)(1); and (2) preempting States 
from imposing liability on commercial, nonprofit, and edu-
cational entities as well as libraries that is inconsistent with 
this regime, 47 U.S.C. §223(f)(2). We hoped that, with these 
and several other important revisions, public and private 
network providers could receive at least some benefit from 
passage of the CDA even if the remainder of the statute 
survived judicial review.
Notwithstanding our success in mitigating the risk 
posed by Stratton Oakmont and the CDA within the text 
of the CDA itself, we recognized that the online industry 
required more in the way of liability protection if it were to 
realize its full potential. If liability arose from content not 
addressed by the CDA, would the facially broad exculpa-
tory language prohibiting lawsuits and disclaiming liability 
still hold? What would happen if key parts of the CDA were 
struck down by the courts, as we expected and in fact oc-
curred? (See Reno v. ACLU.) How could we possibly antic-
ipate how this technology would evolve and whether new 
capabilities would give rise to unforeseen liabilities? Would 
Cubby even remain good law for the Internet? Fortunately, 
another vehicle had appeared that the industry could work 
in parallel with the Senate’s CDA initiative.
Admittedly galvanized in opposition to the Stratton Oak-
mont decision, House members Chris Cox and Ron Wyden 
introduced bipartisan legislation to remove that decision’s 
glaring disincentive for online services to act responsibly 
with respect to the information transiting their networks. I 
and other representatives of the online industry, as well as 
additional interest groups, were given the opportunity to 
work with those Congressmen on their draft of the Internet 
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, including what 
became known as the Good Samaritan Provision, as even-
tually codified in new §230 of the Communications Act. As 
the latter name suggests, the initial core of that legislation 
essentially mimicked the CDA’s protection against liabili-
ty for good faith blocking and screening of objectionable 
content. 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2), (d)(3). But, the sponsors were 
determined to go a step further here.
Initially, they included findings recognizing the value 
of the Internet in making available “educational and infor-
mational resources to … citizens” and that it has “flour-
ished … with a minimum of government regulation.” 47 
U.S.C. §230(a). They then declared that it is U.S. policy “to 
promote the continued development of the Internet” and 
specifically “to remove disincentives [such as Stratton Oak-
mont] for the development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies” to enable parents and providers to 
restrict “children’s access to objectionable” materials online. 
47 U.S.C. §230(b) (emphasis added). Most importantly, they 
also inserted the affirmative, broadly exculpatory statement 
that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider.” 47 
U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (emphasis added). In effect, this provision 
both codified Cubby for the online world and extended its 
reach beyond mere conduit services to cover all third party 
content. Despite the obvious overlap with sections of the 
CDA, the Conference Committee between the House and 
the Senate accepted both provisions in their entirety with 
only minor revisions, while specifically emphasizing their 
intent to overturn Stratton Oakmont. Conference Report at 
194. The next step would be judicial construction.
In the Good Samaritan Provision’s first major test, the 
Fourth Circuit in Zeran concluded that subsection (c)(1) 
of §230, as supported by and interpreted consistent with 
Congress’ express goals in favor of the development of an 
unregulated Internet and the empowerment of families 
to control its use, does provide expansive immunity from 
liability for online services for content provided by others 
on their systems. Indeed, Zeran’s broad reading of the Good 
Samaritan Provision has been upheld and applied repeated-
ly over the past 20 years, and the Internet has flourished in 
large part as a result of that enlightened opinion. No other 
piece of legislation or judicial decision has had a more posi-
tive impact on the online industry and its users. But, ironi-
cally, neither may have existed absent the litigious actions 
of an unscrupulous brokerage firm in New York City.
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Serendipity and Internet 
Law: How the ‘Zeran v. AOL’ 
Landmark Almost Wasn’t
Zeran v. AOL may not be a household name, but 
it is the Internet’s most important landmark 
ruling. This seminal court case, which was the 
first…
By Patrick J. Carome and Cary A. Glynn
Z
eran v. AOL may not be a household name, but it 
is the Internet’s most important landmark ruling. 
This seminal court case, which was the first to 
consider the meaning and scope of §230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, has been a pillar 
of the legal framework that has permitted revolutionary 
services such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter to exist and 
thrive. Under Zeran, websites are generally immune from 
liability for unlawful or harmful third-party content. Put 
simply, this precedent is largely responsible for the Internet 
as we know it.
Over the past two decades, Zeran has been cited in over 
250 judicial opinions and discussed in hundreds of law review 
articles. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III’s masterful opinion in 
Zeran has also stood the test of time. Virtually every U.S. 
Court of Appeals, and many state supreme courts, have 
looked to the decision as a reliable key for understanding the 
reach and meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court has 
denied dozens of cert petitions seeking to call Zeran and its 
progeny into question, including in Doe v. Backpage earlier 
this year. And Congress, in the course of enacting subsequent 
legislation extending the reach of §230, has hailed the deci-
sion as having “correctly interpreted” the statute.
But Zeran as we know it might never have happened.This 
essay examines various ways in which, if one or two stars had 
aligned differently, the first case decided under §230 would 
not have been Zeran, or at least not Judge Wilkinson’s pro-
found and broad landmark. These many layers of serendipity 
highlight how important legal developments—that in hindsight 
may be taken for granted—may be affected by seemingly 
small and even random events.
For starters, it took the bizarre, cruel, and persistent 
actions of an unidentified troll to set the ball in motion. 
Whatever motivated the “author” of the online postings that 
launched this controversy will probably never be known. But 
his or her impact on Internet law is now clear. In April 1995, 
six days after the terrorist bombing of the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City killed 168 people (including many 
children), this miscreant used a series of AOL screen names 
(including “Ken Z033” and “Ken ZZ03”) to post fake online 
advertisements for “Naughty Oklahoma T-shirts” purporting 
to celebrate the attack. T-Shirt “design #651,” for example, 
would read “Finally, a day care center that keeps the kids 
quiet – Oklahoma City 1995.” The slogan for “design #568” 
was “Visit Oklahoma . . . . It’s a BLAST.” The ads directed view-
ers to call a phone number that Kenneth Zeran, a free-lance 
artist and film producer in Seattle who had never been an 
AOL subscriber, used for his home office. The ads told them 
to “ask for Ken,” and added that, “due to high demand please 
call back if busy.” There has never been any hint of why the 
unfortunate Mr. Zeran was targeted.
See Figure 1, next page.
The cruel hoax might never have led to litigation if the 
fake ads had not gained notoriety outside whatever subset 
of AOL users (who then numbered around 2.5 million) might 
have encountered them on the AOL “classifieds” bulletin 
board where they were posted. But four days after the first 
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ad appeared, someone emailed one of the ads to Mark 
Shannon, then the co-host of a popular morning radio show 
(“Shannon & Spinozi”) on KRXO-FM in Oklahoma City. And 
two mornings later, while on-air, Shannon “read out the slo-
gans purportedly displayed on the Oklahoma City T-shirts, 
attributed these slogans to Ken at the telephone number of 
Ken Zeran, characterized the person who did this as ‘sick’, 
and incited the audience to call” Ken. That broadcast, which 
Zeran’s lawyers later described as “devastating,” itself 
was not pre-ordained. Shannon had had the good sense to 
try to contact Zeran directly before the fateful broadcast. 
But there was yet another stroke of horrible bad luck for 
Mr. Zeran—and another bit of serendipity that pointed this 
controversy toward the courts: Shannon was unable to get 
through to him.
Just shy of a year later (on April 23, 1996), Mr. Zeran 
did, of course, commence litigation in federal court against 
AOL. But he did not sue AOL in a forum that was likely to 
lead to an appellate decision in the Fourth Circuit, where 
Zeran was ultimately decided. Nor did he sue in his home 
district in Washington state. Had he done so, any appeal in 
the case would have gone to the Ninth Circuit. Instead, he 
sued AOL in federal court in Oklahoma City, the same place 
where, three months earlier, he had sued Diamond Broad-
casting, owner of KRXO-FM. Perhaps his lawyers initially 
sued Diamond/KRXO in Oklahoma City because they were 
concerned about whether it could be successfully hauled 
into court in Seattle, and then chose the same venue for 
the suit against AOL as a matter of efficiency. Or, perhaps, 
they expected jurors from Oklahoma would most readily 
sympathize with a plaintiff who had been victimized by a 
grotesque stunt that mocked the unspeakable tragedy that 
had occurred there.
If AOL had accepted Mr. Zeran’s choice of venue, his 
case would never have come before Judge Wilkinson, and 
any appeal would have gone to the Tenth Circuit. That 
course was averted, however, because AOL’s initial move 
was a motion that, in addition to seeking dismissal for 
improper venue and failure to state a claim, requested, in 
the alternative, a transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia, 
where AOL was headquartered. The Oklahoma judge held 
that venue was proper, based in part on AOL’s concession 
that it was subject to personal jurisdiction there. Neverthe-
less, the judge granted transfer to Virginia as a matter of 
“convenience,” mainly because AOL and its witnesses were 
there.
If Zeran’s lawyers had sued Diamond/KRXO and AOL in 
a single lawsuit—which would have been perfectly natural, 
and which they unsuccessfully tried to accomplish after-the-
fact by asking the Oklahoma judge to consolidate the two 
cases, the case probably would have stayed put in Oklaho-
ma. Given the hoaxster’s disgusting statements about the 
Oklahoma City bombing, one can only wonder whether an 
Oklahoma-based court would have had greater skepticism 
for AOL’s novel §230 defense than the judges who in fact 
adjudicated the case: District Judge T. S. Ellis in Alexandria, 
Virginia, and the Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia.
Aside from uncertainties regarding whether and where 
any claims by Mr. Zeran would be litigated, it was far from 
certain that the litigation would revolve around §230. In 
fact, as of late April 1995, when the fake ads appeared on an 
AOL bulletin board, §230 —along with the rest of the Com-
munications Decency Act and the rest of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996—was not even on the books. Indeed, 
those unfortunate events occurred a full two months before 
Representatives Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) and Ron Wyden 
(D-Ore.) introduced the original predecessor to §230, a bill 
called the “Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act” 
(H.R. 1978). And it would still be another seven months, until 
February 8, 1996, before the CDA, including the final version 
of §230, would be enacted and take effect.
Mr. Zeran waited until April 23, 2016—two days before 
the one-year anniversary of the posting of the first fake ad 
and eleven weeks after §230 was enacted—before suing 
AOL. Perhaps his lawyers were focused on the one-year 
statute of limitations for defamation actions under the laws 
of many states (including Oklahoma and Virginia). If they 
had been astute enough to know that §230 was under con-
sideration and to recognize its potential impact, maybe they 
would have accelerated their efforts and filed suit against 
AOL a few months earlier, before President Clinton signed 
the bill into law. In that scenario, Zeran v. AOL likely would 
not have been the first case in which a court ruled on the 
scope of §230’s protections for online intermediaries.
Both Judge Ellis and the Fourth Circuit later held that 
AOL’s ability to invoke §230 in Zeran turned on the timing 
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of the suit. Focusing on the language of what was then 
§230(d)(1)—“No cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section”—the Fourth Circuit held that 
“Congress clearly expressed its intent that the statute apply 
to any complaint instituted after its effective date, regard-
less of when the relevant conduct giving rise to the claims 
occurred.” Absent that holding and some fortuitous tim-
ing, Judge Wilkinson and his colleagues would never have 
reached the merits of AOL’s §230 defense.
The Oklahoma City lawyers who originally represented 
AOL in Zeran and succeeded in having the case transferred 
were aware of §230’s enactment. They briefly discussed the 
statute in the “merits” portion of the briefs supporting the 
motion to dismiss they filed in federal court in Oklahoma. 
Yet far from recognizing this might be a ground-breaking 
case about the meaning of the brand-new statute, they 
did not argue that the statute actually applied to the case. 
Instead, apparently because §230’s enactment post-dated 
the conduct at issue, they expressly conceded that “[t]he 
Act may not operate to control the events upon which this 
lawsuit is based unless it is found to be retroactive.” They 
offered no argument at all regarding why §230 should con-
trol despite the timing of its enactment.
The arguments for dismissal that AOL’s Oklahoma 
counsel did make focused on principles of negligence under 
Oklahoma common law, including duty, foreseeability, and 
non-liability for the deliberate acts of a third party. They 
briefly alluded to the First Amendment. And, under the 
heading “Recent Developments in the Law of Cybertorts,” 
they contrasted the 1991 decision by a federal district judge 
in Cubby v. Compuserve with the 1995 decision by a New 
York state trial judge in Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy. They 
only got around to discussing §230 in a two-paragraph 
argument headed “The Future of Cybertorts,” in which they 
described the new federal law, stated that it “supports” 
Cubby and “eviscerates” Stratton-Oakmont, and noted that 
“henceforth” it would “protect services such as AOL.” Had 
AOL’s defense continued along these lines, perhaps AOL 
would have prevailed on state law grounds. In those circum-
stances, the first judicial construction of §230 would have 
been left to a different case in a different court.
After the case traveled east, serendipity struck even 
in the way Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, where the senior 
co-author of this article (Patrick Carome) had been practic-
ing media law for nearly a decade, became involved. Neither 
Carome nor Wilmer had previously done work for AOL, even 
though it was an up-and-coming new-media company in 
Vienna, Virginia, not far from Wilmer’s main office in Wash-
ington, D.C. A month or two before the transfer, however, 
Carome learned that an in-house lawyer at his client The 
Washington Post, Elizabeth Blumenfeld, was about to switch 
jobs and join AOL’s fast-growing legal department. Carome 
asked Blumenfeld to keep an eye out for opportunities for 
AOL to retain him and his firm. Soon after she got to AOL, 
Blumenfeld called Carome about a case that was being 
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, for which AOL 
needed to select new counsel: Zeran v. AOL.
The process AOL used to select new counsel for the 
case was an in-writing “beauty contest.” The in-house 
lawyers, Randall Boe and Blumenfeld, asked Wilmer and 
two other Washington law firms known for their significant 
media litigation practices to each submit a written pro-
posal setting out a strategy for defending the case and an 
estimate of fees. Carome and two of his colleagues, John 
Payton and Samir Jain, dove into the exercise. Even though 
AOL had already used its one shot at a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), and even though its Oklahoma 
counsel had come close to conceding that §230 was inap-
plicable to the case, the Wilmer team devised a strategy to 
bring §230 front and center. Specifically, the team proposed 
that AOL (1) file an answer asserting §230 and the First 
Amendment as affirmative defenses, (2) move for judgment 
on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c) based solely on 
§230, and (3) argue in that motion that application of §230 
would not be impermissibly “retroactive.” Wilmer also pro-
posed a loss-leading fixed fee: $50,000 to defend the case 
through a decision on the proposed Rule 12(c) motion. Even 
20 years ago, that was an aggressively low figure, especially 
because that fee would also have to cover Wilmer’s han-
dling of many other tasks, including responding to pending 
discovery requests and taking Mr. Zeran’s deposition, which 
had to be done quickly to meet the demanding pretrial 
schedule set in the Eastern District of Virginia, which was 
then (and is now) commonly called “the rocket docket.”
Based on the competing firms’ written submissions 
and some follow-up telephone calls, AOL retained Wilmer. 
At least one of the other firms did not mention the §230 
defense in its proposed case strategy. A reliable source 
recently said that AOL asked one or both of the other two 
firms to match Wilmer’s proposed fee, but they did not. 
Wilmer’s §230-centric strategy also was important to AOL, 
which was keenly aware of the broader significance of this 
case to its business model. That strategy prevailed, both be-
fore District Judge Ellis and, ultimately, in the Fourth Circuit. 
Had Wilmer not been invited to pitch for the representation, 
or if AOL had chosen different lawyers, might the path and 
outcome have varied?
Nor, of course, was the role of the most important figure 
in this story—then Chief Judge Wilkinson—preordained. As of 
July 1997, when briefing of the appeal was completed, there 
were 16 judges on the Fourth Circuit (three of whom were 
on senior status), any of whom (absent a conflict of interest) 
could have been assigned to the case. In 1997, the Fourth 
Circuit issued 283 published decisions. Judge Wilkinson 
participated in 61 of them, and he wrote an opinion for the 
court or a concurrence in 33, with 24 for a unanimous court. 
So, when the long chain of events described above finally 
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landed Zeran in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
the statistical chance that Judge Wilkinson would cast a 
vote in the case was at best one in five. And if there was to 
be a published decision from the Fourth Circuit in the case, 
the statistical chance (as of the time the appeal was filed) 
that it would turn out to be a unanimous opinion penned by 
Judge Wilkinson (as occurred in Zeran) was less than one in 
10.
As Carome, his colleague Samir Jain, and AOL in-house 
counsel Randall Boe awoke in Richmond on October 2, 1997, 
none of them knew (or could know) which judges would 
be present when Zeran was called for oral argument later 
that morning. The Fourth Circuit’s protocol was then (and is 
now) not to announce the composition of its panels until the 
morning of oral argument. The first thing Carome did after 
checking in with the clerk’s office that morning was to go 
to a courthouse telephone booth to dial a colleague back in 
Washington, to get a quick read on the three judges he had 
just learned would hear the case: Chief Judge Wilkinson; 
Circuit Judge Donald S. Russell; and, sitting by designation, 
Judge Terrence Boyle, then the Chief Judge of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 
Carome worried about the seemingly conservative bent of 
the panel—two Reagan appointees (Wilkinson and Boyle) 
and a Nixon appointee who before Watergate had served as 
a legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC). 
He also worried whether any of the members of the panel 
had familiarity with an interactive computer service such as 
AOL, CompuServe, or Prodigy. All three judges had been on 
the bench since at least 1984, well before the popularization 
of email and the Internet. Judge Russell was 91 years old, 
and his appointment to the court (in 1971) predated “the 
first public demonstration of the ARPANET.”
One potentially hopeful note Carome gleaned from his 
team back in Washington was that Judge Wilkinson had a 
newspaper background. In between stints as a law professor 
at University of Virginia School of Law, he worked for three 
years at The Virginian-Pilot in Norfolk, including as edito-
rial page editor. Perhaps his on-the-ground experience in 
traditional media would give him a heightened appreciation 
for the sort of free speech interests embodied in §230. In 
fact, that experience may well have had a bearing on the 
important First Amendment notes that Judge Wilkinson 
later struck in Zeran, including his reliance on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, which, 
he wrote, “recogniz[ed] that fears of unjustified liability pro-
duce a chilling effect antithetical to [the] First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.”
Having Judge Wilkinson on the panel, and having him be 
the author of the decision in favor of AOL, was no guaran-
tee that the case would produce the broad, plain-spoken 
holding of Zeran that has been cited so often over the 
past twenty years: “By its plain language, § 230 creates a 
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a 
third-party user of the service.” Judge Wilkinson and his 
colleagues might have hewn more closely to the ideal of 
judicial minimalism, heralded by scholars such as Harvard 
Law Professor Cass Sunstein, which expects judges to issue 
narrow rulings confined to the facts at hand. The opinion 
in Zeran may not have strictly adhered to that approach, 
broadly declaring websites immune from so-called “dis-
tributor liability” (i.e., the sort of notice-based liability that 
the First Amendment might allow the law to impose on a 
bookseller) and declining to confine §230 to only defama-
tion claims. While the opinion was both brilliant and correct, 
a narrower ruling could have emerged. Fortunately, Judge 
Wilkinson instead took a deep interest in the case and 
issued a well-reasoned and sweeping opinion. Both in the 
case at hand and for years to follow, this ruling by a highly 
regarded conservative jurist, who was then Chief Judge of 
a conservative court, has ensured that §230 has had the 
effect Congress intended: lifting what would otherwise be, 
in Judge Wilkinson’s words, “an impossible burden in the 
Internet context.”
After the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the case was not 
entirely over. Mr. Zeran filed a cert petition for review in 
the Supreme Court. It seemed highly unlikely that the high 
Court would take an interest in the case. As this was the 
first case to construe §230, there obviously was no conflict 
among appellate courts, and the Supreme Court rarely 
engages in mere error correction. The Wilmer team and 
AOL advised the Supreme Court that it would not submit 
a brief in opposition to Mr. Zeran’s petition. But on April 21, 
1998, three years to the week after the posting of the fake 
T-shirt ads, the Supreme Court called for a response to Mr. 
Zeran’s petition. The uncertainty finally ended two months 
later, when the Supreme Court denied the petition, leaving 
Judge Wilkinson’s landmark opinion in place as a steady and 
bright—but perhaps not foreordained—beacon to lead other 
courts across the country.
* * *
In an alternate universe in which the Zeran landmark 
never materialized, the first judicial decision addressing the 
scope of §230 probably would have come from a state court in 
a case involving the “third rail” of child pornography. Cap-
tioned Doe v. AOL, that case was filed in the Circuit Court for 
Palm Beach County, Florida, on January 23, 1997. That was 
exactly nine months after Mr. Zeran sued AOL, and about ten 
months before the Fourth Circuit’s Zeran decision. After Zeran, 
Doe v. AOL was the next case to be filed anywhere that would 
produce a reported court decision construing §230. It also was 
the only other case to reach and resolve the “retroactivity” 
question that was decided in Zeran.
Page 4 This essay is part of a larger collection about the impact of Zeran v. AOL curated by Eric Goldman and Jeff Kosseff. Zeran v. AOL
The plaintiff in Doe v. AOL was a mother, referred to 
as Jane Doe, suing on behalf of herself and her minor son, 
John Doe. The defendants were AOL and an AOL user 
named Richard Lee Russell. If the facts in Zeran were very 
bad, the facts in AOL v. Doe were horrible. In 1994, Russell, a 
neighbor of the Does, allegedly lured John Doe, then eleven 
years old, and two other boys to engage in sexual activity 
with each other and with Russell. Russell allegedly photo-
graphed and videotaped those acts, and then used AOL 
chat rooms to market those materials to other pedophiles, 
resulting in the sale of at least one of the videos. By the 
time the suit was filed, Russell was in federal prison based 
on these activities. Jane Doe alleged that AOL had known 
that its chat room feature was being used in this manner 
by pedophiles. One of the more memorable refrains of her 
court papers was that AOL had knowingly allowed its chat 
rooms to become the “Home Shopping Network” for child 
pornography. She asserted claims for negligence and negli-
gence per se, referencing Florida criminal statutes prohibit-
ing the sale or distribution of obscene materials. AOL could 
not remove the case from state to federal court because 
there was no diversity of citizenship (both Jane Doe and 
Russell were from Florida) and because the availability of a 
federal defense generally does not provide a basis for feder-
al question jurisdiction.
As in Zeran, AOL retained Wilmer to defend Doe, and 
once again the defense strategy focused on §230. At each 
step of Florida’s multi-level court system, the presiding judg-
es could look to, and rely on, Zeran as a basis for dismissing 
all of the claims asserted against AOL. In June 1997, the 
Florida Circuit Court (the trial-level court) granted AOL’s 
motion to dismiss based on §230, citing Judge Ellis’ three-
month-old decision in Zeran. Jane Doe promptly appealed 
to the Florida District Court of Appeal. In October 1998, a 
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed “[f]or the 
reasons expressed in Zeran.”
Although the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision in Doe 
was unanimous, it nevertheless called for the Florida Su-
preme Court to examine the case. “[D]eem[ing] the ques-
tions raised as to the application of §230 of the Commu-
nications Decency Act to be of great public importance,” it 
certified to the state high court three questions: whether 
§230 applies in cases where the events predate the stat-
ute’s effective date, whether §230 preempts Florida law, 
and whether §230 provides immunity to a computer service 
provider that had notice of the allegedly unlawful postings.
By a bare 4-3 vote, the Florida Supreme Court approved 
the decision of the Court of Appeal. The majority’s decision 
closely tracked Zeran’s reasoning and block-quoted large 
swaths of Judge Wilkinson’s opinion. Aligning with Judge 
Wilkinson, the slim majority held that “the gravamen of 
Doe’s alleged cause of action” was “liability based upon 
negligent failure to control the content of users’ publishing 
of allegedly illegal postings,” which are “analogous to the 
defamatory publication at issue in the Zeran decisions.”
Would the final vote in Doe v. AOL have been the same 
if Zeran had not already blazed the trail? The facts were 
arguably more shocking than in Zeran. Perhaps one of the 
justices of the Supreme Court of Florida would have tipped 
to weighing Floridian interests more heavily than federal 
interests. Even with the benefit of Zeran, the three dissent-
ing justices met the majority with stinging disagreement. 
Justice Richard Lewis called the majority’s interpretation 
“absurd,” “totally unacceptable,” and based on “faulty 
analysis.” He asked why a website alerted to impermissi-
ble content posted by a customer of its service “may, with 
impunity, do absolutely nothing, and reap the economic 
benefits flowing from the activity?”
* * *
Judge Wilkinson got it absolutely right in Zeran. And, we 
are confident that, even if the Zeran landmark had never ma-
terialized, the courts of the United States nevertheless would 
ultimately have reached a consensus in construing §230 to 
provide broad immunity for online intermediaries, as Congress 
intended. But the path to that outcome might have been more 
difficult and tortured if the first appellate decision interpreting 
the statute had come from a less bold, brilliant, and respected 
jurist than Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson.
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20 Years of Protecting 
Intermediaries: Legacy of 
‘Zeran’ Remains a Critical 
Protection for Freedom of 
Expression Online
Section 230 has proven to be one of the 
most valuable tools for protecting freedom of 
expression and innovation on the Internet.
By Cindy Cohn and Jamie Williams
A
t the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), 
we are proud to be ardent defenders of §230. 
Even before §230 was enacted in 1996, we 
recognized that all speech on the Internet re-
lies upon intermediaries, like ISPs, web hosts, 
search engines, and social media companies. Most of 
the time, it relies on more than one. Because of this, we 
know that intermediaries must be protected from liability 
for the speech of their users if the Internet is to live up 
to its promise, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in ACLU v. Reno, of enabling “any person … [to] become 
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than 
it could from any soapbox“ and hosting “content … as 
diverse as human thought.”
As we hoped—and based in large measure on the 
strength of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran—§230 has 
proven to be one of the most valuable tools for protecting 
freedom of expression and innovation on the Internet. In 
the past two decades, we’ve filed well over 20 legal briefs 
in support of §230, probably more than on any other issue, 
in response to attempts to undermine or sneak around the 
statute. Thankfully, most of these attempts were unsuccess-
ful. In most cases, the facts were ugly—Zeran included. We 
had to convince judges to look beyond the individual facts 
and instead focus on the broader implications: that forcing 
intermediaries to become censors would jeopardize the In-
ternet’s promise of giving a voice to all and supporting more 
robust public discourse than ever before possible.
This remains true today, and it is worth remembering 
now, in the face of new efforts in both Congress and the 
courts to undermine §230’s critical protections.
Attacks on §230: The First 20 Years
The first wave of attacks on §230’s protections came 
from plaintiffs who tried to plead around §230 in an attempt 
to force intermediaries to take down online speech they 
didn’t like. Zeran was the first of these, with an attempt 
to distinguish between “publishers” and “distributors” of 
speech that the Fourth Circuit rightfully rejected. As we 
noted above, the facts were not pretty: the plaintiff sought 
to hold AOL responsible after an anonymous poster used 
his name and phone number on an AOL message board 
to indicate—incorrectly—that he was selling horribly offen-
sive t-shirts about the Oklahoma City bombing. The court 
rightfully held that §230 protected against liability for both 
publishing and distributing user content.
The second wave of attacks came from plaintiffs trying 
to deny §230 protection to ordinary users who reposted 
content authored by others—i.e., an attempt to limit the stat-
ute to protecting only formal intermediaries. In one case, 
Barrett v. Rosenthal, the attackers succeeded at the Califor-
nia court of appeals. But in 2006, the California Supreme 
Court ruled that §230 protects all non-authors who repub-
lish content, not just formal intermediaries like ISPs. This 
ruling—which was urged by EFF as amicus along with several 
other amici—still protects ordinary bloggers and Facebook 
posters in California from liability for content they merely 
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republish. Unsurprisingly, the California Supreme Court’s 
opinion included a four-page section dedicated entirely to 
Zeran.
Another wave of attacks, also in the mid-2000s, came 
as plaintiffs tried to use the Fair Housing Act to hold 
intermediaries responsible when users posted housing 
advertisements that violated the law. Both Craigslist and 
Roommates.com were sued over discriminatory housing 
advertisements posted by their users. The Seventh Circuit, 
at the urging of EFF and other amici, held that §230 immu-
nized Craigslist from liability for classified ads posted by 
its users—citing Zeran first in a long line of cases support-
ing broad intermediary immunity. Despite our best efforts, 
however, the Ninth Circuit found that §230 did not immu-
nize Roommates.com from liability if, indeed, it was subject 
to the law. The majority opinion ignored both us and 
Zeran, citing the case only once in a footnote responding 
to the strong dissent. It found that Roommates.com could 
be at least partially responsible for the development of the 
ads because it had forced its users to fill out a question-
naire about housing preferences that included options that 
the plaintiffs asserted were illegal. The website endured 
four more years of needless litigation before the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately found that it hadn’t actually violated any 
anti-discrimination laws at all, even with the questionnaire. 
The court left its earlier opinion intact, however, and we 
were worried the exception carved out in Roommates.com 
would wreak havoc on §230’s protections. It luckily hasn’t 
been applied broadly by other courts—undoubtedly thanks 
in large part to Zeran’s stronger legal analysis and influ-
ence.
The Fight Continues
We are now squarely in the middle of a fourth wave 
of attack—efforts to hold intermediaries responsible for 
extremist or illegal online content. The goal, again, seems 
to be forcing intermediaries to actively screen users and 
censor speech. Many of these efforts are motivated by 
noble intentions, and the speech at issue is often horrible, 
but these efforts also risk devastating the Internet as we 
know it.
Some of the recent attacks on §230 have been made 
in the courts. So far, they have not been successful. In 
these cases, plaintiffs are seeking to hold social media 
platforms accountable on the theory that providing a 
platform for extremist content counts as material support 
for terrorism. Courts across the country have universally 
rejected these efforts. The Ninth Circuit will be hearing 
one of these cases, Twitter v. Fields, in December.
But the current attacks are unfortunately not only in 
the courts. The more dangerous threats are in Congress. 
Both the House and Senate are considering bills that 
would exempt charges under federal and state criminal 
and civil laws related to sex trafficking from §230’s pro-
tections—the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (S. 1693) 
(SESTA) in the Senate, and the Allow States and Victims to 
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (H.R. 1865) in the House. 
While the legislators backing these laws are largely well 
meaning, and while these laws are presented as target-
ing commercial classified ads websites like Backpage.
com, they don’t stop there. Instead, SESTA and its house 
counterpart punish small businesses that just want to run 
a forum where people can connect and communicate. They 
will have disastrous consequences for community bulletin 
boards and comment sections, without making a dent in 
sex trafficking. In fact, it is already a federal criminal of-
fense for a website to run ads that support sex trafficking, 
and §230 doesn’t protect against prosecutions for viola-
tions of federal criminal laws.
Ultimately, SESTA and its house counterpart would 
impact all platforms that host user speech, big and small, 
commercial and noncommercial. They would also impact 
any intermediary in the chain of online content distribu-
tion, including ISPs, web hosting companies, websites, 
search engines, email and text messaging providers, and 
social media platforms—i.e., the platforms that people 
around the world rely on to communicate and learn every 
day. All of these companies come into contact with us-
er-generated content: ads, emails, text messages, social 
media posts. Under these bills, if any of this user-gener-
ated content somehow related to sex trafficking, even 
without the platform’s knowledge, the platform could be 
held liable.
Zeran’s analysis from 20 years ago demonstrates why 
this is a huge problem. Because these bills would have 
far-reaching implications—just as every other legislative 
proposal for limiting §230—they would open Internet inter-
mediaries, companies, nonprofits, and community support-
ed endeavors alike to massive legal exposure. Under this 
cloud of legal uncertainty, new websites, along with their 
investors, would be wary of hosting open platforms for 
speech—or of even starting up in the first place—for fear 
that they would face crippling lawsuits if third parties used 
their websites for illegal conduct. They would have to bear 
litigation costs even if they were completely exonerated, 
as Roommates.com was after many years. Small plat-
forms that already exist could easily go bankrupt trying 
to defend against these lawsuits, leaving only larger ones. 
And the companies that remained would be pressured to 
over-censor content in order to proactively avoid being 
drawn into a lawsuit.
EFF is concerned not only because this would chill new 
innovation and drive smaller players out of the market. Ul-
timately, these bills would shrink the spaces online where 
ordinary people can express themselves, with disastrous 
results for community bulletin boards and local newspa-
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pers’ comment sections. They threaten to transform the 
relatively open Internet of today into a closed, limited, 
censored Internet. This is the very result that §230 was 
designed to prevent.
Since Zeran, the courts have recognized that without 
strong §230 protections, the promise of the Internet as 
a great leveler—amplifying and empowering voices that 
have never been heard, and allowing ideas to be judged 
on their merits rather than on the deep pockets of those 
behind them—will be lost. Congress needs to abandon its 
misguided efforts to undermine §230 and heed Zeran’s 
time-tested lesson: if we fail to protect intermediaries, we 
fail to protect online speech for everyone.
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How the Supreme Court 
Ignored the Lesson of 
‘Zeran’ and Screwed Up 
Copyright Law on the 
Internet
Roger Allan Ford discusses the problem with 
Congress and the courts not extending the 
‘Zeran v. AOL’ decision for defamation to its 
copyright counterparts.
By Roger Allan Ford
T
wenty years ago, a federal appeals court said 
Kenneth Zeran couldn’t sue AOL for failing to 
remove defamatory posts. It is no exaggeration to 
say that had the court gone the other way, much 
of today’s Internet could not exist in its modern 
form. But when the issue is copyright instead of defama-
tion, Congress and the courts have resisted this lesson; 
instead of nurturing new industries, they’ve snuffed them 
out. And just as it was impossible to guess in 1997 the many 
platforms, tools, and communities that would emerge after 
the Zeran v. AOL decision, it is impossible to know now how 
many innovative industries will never emerge due to its 
copyright counterparts.
Zeran answered a critical question for online services: 
If a user posts something that’s defamatory, and so vio-
lates the law, is the service liable? It’s easy to see why the 
answer must be no. An online community like AOL doesn’t 
work without content contributed by users; without that 
content there is no community. That was true in 1997, and 
it is even truer today, when content generated by users 
underlies all kinds of online services. But if a company had 
to police every piece of user-generated content or, worse, 
were liable every time a user went too far, it would be 
impossible to run online services at scale. Facebook and 
YouTube couldn’t vet each post for defamation liability; 
certainly a 10-person startup couldn’t do so.
So Zeran made it possible for online services to exist 
without incurring crippling liability. And that led to a surge of 
services that billions of users rely on, an explosion the scale 
and breadth of which the court could not have imagined in 
1997. Some of these services are straightforward descendants 
of AOL and its contemporaries: discussion forums, search en-
gines, and blogging platforms all resemble tools that existed 
in 1997. Others were less foreseeable. Social networks and 
online video existed in 1997, but the sheer variety and scope 
of platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Snapchat would 
surprise someone from 1997; likewise, tools like Wikipedia, 
Genius, and Adblock Plus, which rely on content contributed 
by users, had few parallels when Zeran was decided.
Zeran’s rule of limited liability was a public-policy success 
because it created free space in which whole industries could 
develop. The same cannot be said of copyright policy on the 
Internet; if Zeran had sued AOL for failing to take down copy-
righted content instead of defamatory content, he probably 
would have won. So new business models that involve copy-
righted content are at much greater risk than those involving 
other kinds of user-generated content.
Take the case of Aereo, a service that let users watch 
broadcast TV on the Internet. Courts had long held that 
consumers can legally copy works for space-shifting and 
time-shifting, so they can watch and listen to video and music 
at different times on different devices. This is what iPods and 
DVRs do, and it’s also what Aereo promised to let users do. 
Aereo set up individual, dime-sized antennas for users so they 
could record and stream broadcast TV channels. This system 
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was just a remote DVR: instead of recording shows onto a 
hard drive in her home, a user could outsource that function 
to Aereo, just as she might outsource email or file storage 
to an online service. And so the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held that what Aereo did was legal, just 
like any other DVR would be.
The Supreme Court disagreed, in a funhouse mirror 
image of Zeran that destroyed innovation instead of en-
couraging it. The court noted that Aereo marketed itself as 
a replacement for cable TV and reasoned that since cable 
companies “perform the copyrighted work[s] publicly” when 
they transmit them to subscribers, Aereo must do so as 
well. It didn’t matter that Aereo’s transmissions were trig-
gered by users, not Aereo itself, or that each user recorded 
and transmitted her own copy from her own antenna, or 
that the transmissions were available only to the user, not 
to the broader public. Instead of analyzing these key distin-
guishing features of the Aereo system, the court adopted 
what Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, called a “looks-like-
cable-TV” test: if a company creates a new business model 
that competes with an incumbent technology, courts should 
bend the law to apply the same copyright rules to each. So 
while in Zeran the court took a narrow view of the plaintiff’s 
rights, requiring him to sue the people who posted defam-
atory content instead of the platform hosting that content, 
in Aereo it took the broadest possible view of the plaintiff’s 
rights.
Did the Aereo decision actually prevent any innovation? 
It’s impossible to tell for sure, but there are all sorts of 
possible business models that would run afoul of the court’s 
rule. One big contender would be a service to solve frag-
mentation in video streaming. When all TV was broadcast 
over the air, people could buy any TV set and pick up any 
show on any channel. As video moves online, though, there 
is no streaming service that has every show and no box that 
can run every streaming service. Instead of just changing 
the channel, today a user might have to skip a show if she 
doesn’t have a box that can play it. It’s easy to imagine a 
service, then, that could tune in and stream video from 
any service to a custom app or a web browser—effectively, 
space-shifting for streaming services. But under Aereo, 
that service is probably illegal. The result is that incumbent 
rights-holders can veto new businesses that might threaten 
their incumbency, a power they have been happy to exer-
cise.
Copyright holders have long used their copyright mo-
nopoly—legally—to prevent competition, but they have been 
constrained by limitations like the first-sale doctrine. Back 
when Blockbuster Video was the state of the art in watch-
ing movies, studios couldn’t stop stores from renting them, 
since the law blocks a copyright holder from restricting 
what someone does with a copy after it has been sold. But 
the shift to online business models has upset this balance 
between creators and others using those creations, since 
online streaming inherently creates copies and so isn’t sub-
ject to the first-sale doctrine.
The Aereo court could have helped restore the balance 
between creation and competition by limiting rights-holders’ 
powers, letting people use online services to do the same 
things they have long been able to do offline. This would 
have encouraged entrepreneurs to create valuable new 
businesses and services, just as the Zeran decision did two 
decades earlier. Instead, the court went the other way. The 
fault may lie more with Congress than with the courts, since 
in Zeran, Congress had created an express immunity for 
businesses relying on user-generated content; Congress’s 
similar immunity for copyrighted content, a safe-harbor rule 
that applies when sites have notice and take down allegedly 
infringing content, is much more limited. Still, there is a long 
history in copyright law of technologies that look like pirates 
at first but eventually become respected businesses; record-
ed music, the VCR, even sheet music were all at one point 
seen as threats to rights holders. Congress and the courts 
should keep the Zeran lesson in mind before backing away 
from that history and preemptively killing off the online 
services of tomorrow.
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Moral Hazard on Stilts: 
‘Zeran’s’ Legacy
The Internet today is awash in threats, 
harassment, defamation, and conspiracy 
theories which disproportionately burden 
vulnerable citizens, while the websites, 
platforms, and ISPs that make it possible are 
protected from harm.
By Mary Anne Franks 
L
ess than a week after the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing that left 168 people dead, Kenneth Zeran 
began receiving threatening phone calls at his 
home. He soon discovered the reason: without 
Zeran’s knowledge, an anonymous hoaxer had 
posted a message on an America Online (AOL) bulletin 
board advertising t-shirts and other paraphernalia glori-
fying the attack, providing Zeran’s home phone number 
for interested buyers to call. Although AOL complied with 
Zeran’s request that the message be removed, new messag-
es with similar content continued to be posted to the site. 
At one point, Zeran was receiving threatening calls every 
two minutes. After an Oklahoma City radio station read the 
slogans on air and urged listeners to call Zeran, the phone 
calls became so threatening that Zeran’s house was placed 
under protective surveillance.
Zeran sued AOL for negligence, arguing that the company 
had failed to respond appropriately after being made aware 
of the nature of the posts. The case eventually made its way 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held 
that Zeran’s claim was preempted by §230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act (CDA). In reaching its decision, the court 
asserted that “Congress’ clear objective in passing §230 of 
the CDA was to encourage the development of technologies, 
procedures and techniques by which objectionable materi-
al could be blocked or deleted,” and holding AOL liable as 
a distributor for offensive content would conflict with this 
objective. The court reasoned that the possibility of distribu-
tor liability, which applies when a distributor is aware of the 
unlawful nature of the content, would prompt intermediaries 
like AOL to refrain from monitoring content at all.
In effect, the court held that entities such as AOL could 
not be held liable for being nonresponsive to unlawful content 
because doing so would encourage them to be nonresponsive 
to unlawful content. The court ignored the obvious point that 
Zeran’s experience suggested that online intermediaries were 
already insufficiently motivated to address unlawful content. 
The court provided no evidence for the claim that distributor 
liability would make them more so, and failed to recognize 
that taking distributor liability for websites and ISP off the 
table in fact “has the effect of discouraging self-policing of 
content,”[1] contrary to the goal the court itself cited. As one 
commentator describes it, “[w]ebsites and ISPs know that no 
matter how inflammatory third-party postings are, complaints 
from aggrieved parties will be to no avail, even after notice to 
the website or ISP.”[2]
In economics, the lack of incentive to guard against risk 
where one is protected from its consequences is known as a 
“moral hazard.” Zeran’s interpretation of §230 (c)(1), which 
states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider” creates 
a clear moral hazard. Twenty years on, there is no evidence 
that broad immunity from liability has done anything more 
than encourage websites and ISPs to be increasingly reckless 
with regard to abusive and unlawful content on their platforms. 
Today, the Internet is awash in threats, harassment, defamation, 
revenge porn, propaganda, misinformation, and conspiracy 
theories, which disproportionately burden vulnerable private 
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citizens including women, racial and religious minorities, and 
the LGBT community. They are the ones who suffer while the 
websites, platforms, and ISPs that make it possible for these 
abuses to flourish are protected from harm.
The moral hazard created by protecting interactive 
computer service providers from liability, even when they 
knowingly feature, aggregate, and distribute unlawful 
content, is compounded by the increasing corporate dom-
ination of the Internet. Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, 
and Microsoft are now the five largest firms in the world 
based on market value, and they exert outsized influence 
on Internet communication and commerce. The corporate 
structure itself creates its own moral hazard: “the nature of 
corporate action, where bureaucracy dictates that most of 
the actors are far removed from the actual harm that might 
occur as a result of their decisions, increases the likelihood 
of egregious conduct.”[3] The corporations that exert 
near-monopoly control of the Internet are thus doubly pro-
tected from the costs of their risky ventures even as they 
reap the benefits. The dominant business model of websites 
and social media services is based on advertising revenue, 
and “abusive posts still bring in considerable ad revenue… 
the more content that is posted, good or bad, the more ad 
money goes into their coffers.” As Astra Taylor writes in The 
People’s Platform, these Internet entities are “commercial 
enterprises designed to maximize revenue, not defend polit-
ical expression, preserve our collective heritage, or facili-
tate creativity.”[4] As currently interpreted, §230 provides 
virtually no way to hold these increasingly powerful entities 
accountable for the harm they cause.
In a footnote, the Zeran court writes that the “CDA re-
flects Congress’ attempt to strike the right balance between 
the competing objectives of encouraging the growth of the 
Internet on one hand, and minimizing the possibility of harm 
from the abuse of that technology on the other.” While the 
court reiterates that Congress has the right to decide how 
to fulfill its own purposes, it notes “today’s problems may 
soon be obsolete while tomorrow’s challenges are, as yet, 
unknowable. In this environment, Congress is likely to have 
reasons and opportunities to revisit the balance struck in 
CDA.” Twenty years of moral hazards might be enough.
Endnotes:
[1] David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communica-
tions Decency Act?: The Reverberations of ‘Zeran v. Ameri-
ca Online,’ 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 371, 403 (2010)
[2] Id.
[3] David Niose, Fighting Back the Right: Reclaiming 
America from the Attack on Reason (2014), 45
[4] Astra Taylor, The People’s Platform: Taking Back 
Power and Culture in the Digital Age (2014) 221.
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The Possible Redundancy  
of §230
Both fans and foes of Zeran assume that its 
interpretation of §230 changed the scope 
of liability for ISPs under the common law 
republication rule. Author Brian L. Frye isn’t so 
sure.
By Brian L. Frye
W
hile hard cases often make bad law, occa-
sionally they also make good law, often by 
accident. And few cases are harder or made 
better law than Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
(4th Cir. 1997), in which the court held that 
§230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) 
exempts internet service providers (ISPs) from liability for 
statements made by third parties.
Many commentators believe Zeran “saved the internet” 
by enabling ISPs to permit unfiltered speech. But others 
argue Zeran misinterpreted §230, which was intended to 
encourage ISPs to filter speech. I think Zeran reached the 
right result, whatever Congress intended §230 to accomplish, 
because AOL wasn’t liable under the common law rule, either.
Both fans and foes of Zeran assume that its interpreta-
tion of §230 changed the scope of liability for ISPs under the 
common law republication rule. I’m not so sure. While §230 
requires courts to use different words than the common law 
rule, the Zeran interpretation of §230 produces essentially 
the same results as the common law rule, properly applied.
The Common Law of Libel & the 
Republication Rule
Under the common law, a person who publishes a false 
and defamatory statement is liable for libel. The First Amend-
ment sets a standard of fault of “actual malice” for state-
ments about “public figures” and “negligence” for state-
ments of “public concern” about “private figures.” And the 
“republication rule” provides that a person who knowingly 
or recklessly disseminates a libelous statement attributed to 
a third party is also liable for libel. Under the republication 
rule, “publishers” (e.g., newspapers) are liable because they 
necessarily know the content of a statement they publish, 
“distributors” (e.g., newsstands) are liable only if they know or 
should have known about the libelous content of a statement 
they distribute, and “conduits” (e.g., mail carriers) are not 
liable because they cannot know the content of a statement 
they deliver.
The Road to Zeran
Initially, courts simply applied the republication rule to li-
bel claims against ISPs acting as intermediaries. Some courts 
held that ISPs were “distributors,” because they did not 
exercise editorial control over third-party statements. But in 
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy (N.Y. Sup. 1995), a New York trial 
court held that an ISP was a “publisher,” because it exercised 
some editorial control over third-party statements posted to 
a “bulletin board.” Congress enacted §230 explicitly in order 
to overrule Stratton Oakmont, providing that an ISP is not the 
“publisher” of “any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider,” even if it filters that information.
In 1995, an anonymous AOL subscriber purporting to 
be Kenneth Zeran advertised offensive T-shirts on an AOL 
bulletin board. Zeran asked AOL to remove the posts, and it 
complied. But in 1996, Zeran filed a libel action against AOL, 
arguing that it was liable as a distributor because it knew 
about the defamatory posts. The district court granted AOL’s 
motion to dismiss on the pleadings and the 4th Circuit af-
firmed, holding that §230 exempted AOL from liability for all 
statements made by third parties.
The Zeran court explained that under the republication 
rule, anyone who disseminates a libelous statement is a “pub-
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lisher” of that statement:
The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one 
from an original publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the 
law. To the contrary, once a computer service provider re-
ceives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust 
into the role of a traditional publisher.
The court also observed that treating ISPs as “distrib-
utors” would impose potential notice-based liability, and 
create “a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon 
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not,” 
thereby chilling speech.
Section 230 v. the Republication Rule
Zeran encouraged the development of social media by 
enabling ISPs to refrain from filtering speech, without fear 
of liability. But critics argued that it interpreted §230 too 
broadly, and improperly granted ISPs special protection 
against libel claims. The combination of §230 and Zeran 
certainly created a liability rule unique to ISPs. Rather than 
apply the republication rule, courts effectively ask whether 
ISPs are acting as speakers or intermediaries.
But Zeran also precluded courts from simply adapting 
the republication rule to ISPs. In theory, the republication 
rule applies to any dissemination of a libelous statement 
made by a third party, irrespective of the context in which 
it is presented. But in practice, a congeries of “privileges” 
and “exceptions” often preclude liability. Courts rarely find 
publishers liable for libelous statements attributed to a third 
party, unless the publisher knew or should have known the 
statement was false. And they are even more reluctant to 
find mere distributors liable.
The republication rule is sensitive to context, and the 
internet is just another context. A few early cases suggest 
that courts might have construed the republication rule 
favorably to ISPs. A 2010 empirical study of defamation 
claims against intermediaries found that §230 produced 
outcomes statistically similar to the common law rule. And 
some recent cases have exempted ISPs from liability for 
third-party statements without applying §230. In other 
words, §230 and the republication rule might have reached 
a similar result by slightly different paths. The medium is 
not the message.
While Zeran purported to invoke the republication rule, 
he actually asked the court to expand its scope, and the 
court wisely declined. The person harassing Zeran surely 
was liable for libel. But AOL was not, under §230 or the 
common law rule, because it was merely a conduit, or at 
most a distributor. AOL’s bulletin boards were analogous to 
physical bulletin boards. No reasonable person could believe 
that the owner of a bulletin board in a public place endorses 
everything posted on it, and no reasonable person could be-
lieve that AOL endorsed its bulletin board postings. Owners 
of public bulletin boards — whether physical or virtual — are 
liable for libelous postings under the republication rule only 
if they refuse to remove them, thereby implicitly adopting 
the libel as their own.
The statements falsely attributed to Zeran were libelous 
because distasteful, but were otherwise perfectly legal, and 
could have been ads for an actual business. Zeran’s com-
plaint was that AOL didn’t prevent their posting, or remove 
them quickly enough. But the republication rule doesn’t 
attribute statements to distributors without knowledge, and 
doesn’t require immediate removal.
Typically, ISPs voluntarily remove libelous statements, 
once they become aware of them. But it is unclear whether 
§230 shields ISPs from injunctions to remove libelous mate-
rial. Some courts have held it does, and others have held it 
doesn’t. Under the republication rule, ISPs would surely be 
liable for continuing to disseminate a third-party statement 
once they know it is libelous. I find it hard to believe that 
courts will ultimately construe §230 differently. At some 
point, refusal to remove a libelous statement must become 
an endorsement.
In addition, §230 may offer ISPs procedural advantages 
over the republication rule. Under §230, actions against 
ISPs are often dismissed on the pleadings, but under the 
republication rule actions often proceed to trial. This could 
reflect substantive differences in the facts: ISPs are typical-
ly entirely ignorant of the content of the statements they 
disseminate, while the ignorance of distributors of informa-
tion in other media may be more qualified. But if §230 does 
offer procedural advantages on the same factual claims, 
perhaps courts ought to ask why, and consider which ap-
proach to procedure is most appropriate.
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The First Hard Case: ‘Zeran 
v. AOL’ and What It Can 
Teach Us About Today’s Hard 
Cases
They say that bad facts make bad law. What 
makes ‘Zeran v. AOL’ stand as a seminal case in 
§230 jurisprudence is that its bad facts didn’t.
By Cathy Gellis
T
hey say that bad facts make bad law. What makes 
Zeran v. AOL stand as a seminal case in §230 
jurisprudence is that its bad facts didn’t. The 
Fourth Circuit wisely refused to be driven from 
its principled statutory conclusion even in the 
face of a compelling reason to do otherwise, and thus the 
greater good was served.
Mr. Zeran’s was not the last hard case to pass through 
the courts. Over the years there have been many worthy 
victims who have sought redress for legally cognizable 
injuries caused by others’ use of online services. And many, 
like Mr. Zeran, have been unlikely to easily obtain it from the 
party who actually did them the harm. In these cases courts 
have been left with an apparently stark choice: compel the 
Internet service provider to compensate for the harm caused 
to the plaintiff by others’ use of their services, or leave the 
plaintiff with potentially no remedy at all. It can be tremen-
dously tempting to want to make someone, anyone, pay for 
harm caused to the person before them. But Zeran provided 
early guidance that it was possible to resist the temptation to 
ignore §230’s liability limitations – and early evidence that it 
was right to so resist.
Section 230 is a law that itself counsels a light touch. In 
order to get the most good content on the Internet and the 
least bad, Congress codified a policy that is essentially all car-
rot and no stick. By taking the proverbial gun away from an 
online service provider’s proverbial head, Congress created 
the incentive for service providers to be partners in achiev-
ing that policy goal. It did this in two complementary ways: 
First, it encouraged the most beneficial content by insulating 
providers for liability arising from how other people used 
their services. Second, Congress also sought to ensure there 
would be the least amount of bad content online by insulating 
providers from liability if they did indeed act to remove it.
By removing the threat of potentially ruinous liability, or 
even just the immense cost of finding itself on the receiving 
end of legal action arising from how others have used their 
services, more and more service providers have been able to 
come into existence and enable more and more uses of their 
systems. These providers have also been able to resist unduly 
censoring legitimate uses of their systems as a means of 
limiting their legal risk. And by being left with the discretion 
to choose what uses to allow or disallow from their systems, 
service providers have been free to allocate their resources 
more effectively to police undesirable use of their systems 
and services than if the threat of liability instead forced them 
to divert their resources in ways that might not be appropri-
ate for their platforms, optimal, or even useful at all.
Congress could of course have addressed the developing 
Internet with an alternative policy, one that was more stick 
than carrot and that threatened penalties instead of offering 
liability limitations, but such a law would not have met its twin 
goals of encouraging the most good content and the least 
bad nearly as well as §230 actually has. In fact, it likely would 
have had the opposite effect, eliminating more good content 
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and missing more of the bad. The wisdom of Congress, and 
of the Zeran court, was in realizing that restraint was a 
better option.
The challenge we are faced with now is keeping courts, 
and §230’s critics, similarly aware. The problem is that the 
§230 policy balance is one that works well generally, but 
not always specifically, and not always in ways people read-
ily recognize. The reality is that people sometimes do use 
Internet services in bad ways, and these uses can often be 
extremely visible. What appears to be less visible, however, 
is how many good uses of the Internet §230 has enabled to 
be developed. In the 20-plus years since Zeran people have 
moved on from AOL to countless new Internet services, 
which now serve nearly 90 percent of all Americans and 
billions of users worldwide. Internet access has gone from 
slow modem-driven dial-up to seamless always-on broad-
band. We email, we tweet, we buy things, we date, we com-
ment, we argue, we read, we research, we share what we 
know, all thanks to the services made possible by §230, but 
often without awareness of how much we owe to it and the 
early Zeran decision upholding its tenets. We even complain 
about §230 using services that §230 has enabled, and often 
without any recognition of the irony.
In a sense, §230 is potentially in jeopardy of becoming 
a victim of its own success. It’s easy to see when things go 
wrong, but §230 has done so well creating a new normalcy 
that it’s much harder to see just how much it has allowed to 
go right. Which means that when things do go wrong – as 
they inevitably will, because while § 230 tries to minimize 
the bad uses of online services it’s impossible to eliminate 
them all—we are always at risk of letting our outrage at the 
specific injustice cause us to be tempted to kill the golden 
goose by upending something that on the whole has en-
abled so much good.
When bad things happen there is a natural urge to 
clamp down, to try to seize control over a situation where 
it feels like there is none. In that microcosm the hands-off 
approach of §230 can seem like the wrong one, but Zeran 
has shown how it is still very much the right one.
In many ways the Zeran court was ahead of its time: un-
like later courts that have been able to point to the success 
of the Internet to underpin their decisions upholding §230, 
the Zeran court had to take a leap of faith that the policy 
goals behind the statute would be born out as Congress 
intended. It turned out to be a faith that was not misplaced. 
Today it is hard to imagine a world without all that §230 
has ushered in. But if we fail to heed the lessons of Zeran 
and exercise the same restraint it did, such a world may 
well be what comes to pass. As we mark 20 years since the 
Zeran court affirmed §230 we need to continue to carry 
its lessons forward in order to ensure that we are not also 
marking its sunset and closing the door on all §230 might 
yet bring.
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Who Cyber-Attacked Ken 
Zeran, and Why?
More than 20 years later, it seems unlikely this 
case of cyber-harassment or “e-personation” 
will ever be solved.
By Eric Goldman 
F
rom late April through early May of 1995, Ken Zer-
an was the victim of an aggressive online attack—
what we would now call a cyber-harassment or 
“e-personation,” though at the time we lacked this 
nomenclature. The attacker was pseudonymous, 
and AOL deleted the relevant server logs (pursuant to what 
AOL said was standard practice) that might have helped 
reveal the attacker. (Note: for this essay I’ll assume it was 
a single person and not multiple attackers, though that 
too remains unknown.) Zeran sued AOL and the Oklahoma 
radio station KRXO for their roles in the cyber-harassment, 
but he never sued the actual perpetrator. Indeed, over two 
decades later, the perpetrator remains unknown. This has 
emerged as one of the greatest unsolved mysteries in inter-
net law: who attacked Ken Zeran, and why?
As part of researching this question, I reviewed the 717-
page transcript of AOL defense lawyer Pat Carome deposing 
Ken Zeran on Feb. 18-20, 1997. Plaintiff lawyer James Ikard 
represented Zeran at the deposition. The deposition tran-
script of Ken Zeran was never filed with the court and is not 
generally publicly available. It doesn’t answer the “whodunit” 
question, but it does suggest some clues.
Let’s start with Zeran’s own appraisal of the situation in 
response to Carome’s point-blank question (emphasis added):
Q: Is it your view that the person who posted the messag-
es that you’re suing over here on AOL’s system is someone 
that does not know you at all?
A: Absolutely … I believe I was picked at random.
Later in the deposition, Zeran said: “I never had the im-
pression that this was done by somebody who knew me. I cer-
tainly, obviously wondered if there was anybody I knew who 
would do this, and I don’t know anybody that would do it.”
Zeran’s hypothesis that he was a random victim isn’t com-
pletely far-fetched. First, in 1995, anarchists and trolls already 
were making random and chaos-inducing online attacks. See, 
e.g., Josh Quittner, The War Between alt.tasteless and rec.
pets.cats, Wired, May 1994. Second, the Secret Service agent 
investigating Zeran’s matter suggested it was a random at-
tack. Zeran described the conversation:
[The Secret Service agent] said that—we were kind of in 
agreement about the—my name being picked—my number at 
random, because after asking me those questions, he came 
out and said that it seemed to him my number had been 
picked at random. I remember when he said that, … that sort 
of confirmed my thoughts in a real positive way, that my num-
ber, in fact, had been selected randomly. And person from the 
Secret Service, he’s—he seemed to be experienced about this 
kind of stuff, so when he said that, you know, it sort of recon-
firmed what my thoughts were.
Still, this hypothesis seems implausible. The attack on 
Zeran involved multiple postings over several days, was 
designed to inflict substantial damage, and involved a phone 
number that would have been hard for any stranger outside 
the Seattle metro area to attribute to Zeran. So let’s consider 
some of the most obvious alternative explanations:
• Romantic Entanglements. At the time of the attacks, 
Zeran had just started dating a new girlfriend for about six 
weeks. (Note: I’ve decided not to publish the names of any 
Zeran’s associates because they are unnecessary to the 
discussion, and I’m not sure their names have otherwise 
surfaced publicly). Around the same time, Zeran had another 
woman friend who was a former romantic partner; Zeran said 
“it was a casual, friendly relationship.” Maybe I’ve watched 
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too many TV soap operas, but these facts set up several 
possibilities. Perhaps one of the women was jealous or 
upset about a possible love triangle; or perhaps one of the 
women’s current or former significant others felt anger 
about Zeran’s involvements.
• Competitors/Current Business Partners. Zeran worked 
on several wide-ranging projects throughout his career, 
including art, entertainment and real estate. At the time, in 
1995, he was launching a new real estate apartment listing 
resource called “The Apartment Special.” This initiative was 
muscling into territory occupied by two competitors who 
also published guides to apartments for rent. Perhaps one 
of these competitors sought to sideline Zeran, or at least 
thwart his endeavor?
Zeran was working on other projects in this timeframe 
as well, including a Halloween-themed television show and 
the Puget Sound Money Connection, a publication that 
promoted various financial institutions. Neither project suc-
ceeded. Could the attacker have been an unhappy business 
partner or competitor?
• Other Creditors. Zeran’s financial picture didn’t clear-
ly emerge in the deposition. Ikard objected to all questions 
about Zeran’s income because Zeran did not seek economic 
damages. Still, it’s clear that Zeran was in the midst of several 
ventures that had proven unsuccessful, and as one of the ex-
hibits indicated, “Mr. Zeran is not a wealthy man.” Could some 
creditor have attacked Zeran over unpaid debts?
• Defendants. In 1993, Zeran sued two former business 
associates, claiming that they stole copyrighted content 
from his Apartment Special television show. The case set-
tled, but could the defendants have held a grudge?
Zeran’s diverse professional activities put him in con-
tact with hundreds of other people over his career, and his 
personal relationships surely involved hundreds more. While 
the deposition transcript does not suggest any of these 
people had malice towards him, such a large universe of 
professional and personal contacts surely contains numer-
ous other suspects who are at least as plausible as the truly 
“random” attacker.
So who attacked Ken Zeran, and why? We still don’t 
know; and after more than 20 years, it seems unlikely this 
cold case will ever be solved.
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No ESC
The thrust and parry of arguments about when 
online speech should stay up or come down 
recapitulate well-worn arguments about when 
offline speech should or shouldn’t be allowed.
By James Grimmelmann
S
ection 230 is subconstitutional free speech law. 
One might naively expect it can steer clear of 
the notorious complexity of First Amendment 
law, and for the most part it does. Both arms of 
§230 establish broad and simple rules. There is 
no mucking about with actual malice, public versus private 
figures, traditional versus limited public forums, tiers of 
scrutiny, or any of the other Ptolemaic doctrinal baggage of 
the First Amendment. Section 230(c)(1) avoids waking the 
slumbering giant by granting immunity rather than impos-
ing liability for speech, §230(c)(2) by giving private actors 
rather than state actors a privilege to block speech on their 
platforms.
Even so, debates about §230’s reach have an oddly fa-
miliar ring to them. The thrust and parry of arguments about 
when online speech should stay up or come down recapitu-
late well-worn arguments about when offline speech should 
or shouldn’t be allowed. There are, I think, three things going 
on. One is that §230 itself is always open to challenge. It may 
be good law, but that doesn’t tell us whether it’s a good law. 
The second is that even though §230’s protection is absolute 
and its coverage broad, its coverage still has limits (as any 
law’s must). Some of those limits look a lot like the limits on 
the scope of “speech” under the First Amendment. And the 
third is that §230 by design gives platforms substantial free-
dom to allow speech or to restrict it. In choosing how to exer-
cise that freedom, they have to confront the same conflicts 
that animate First Amendment doctrine. All three of these 
open the door to the kinds of arguments that one regularly 
sees in First Amendment cases and free speech debates.
Speech vs. conduct. The line between “speech” and 
conduct” in First Amendment doctrine is contested, and so 
is the corresponding line in §230 between “information” or 
“material” of which one can be the “publisher or speaker” 
and everything else. Some plaintiffs try to plead out of 230 
by arguing that failing to supervise sex traffickers, or provid-
ing service to terrorists, is conduct rather than speech. And 
some sharing-economy platforms like AirBnB try to plead into 
§230 by arguing that they provide a forum for users to speak 
(albeit in ways that often lead to transactions).
Hate speech and harassment. When do hate speech 
against groups and harassing speech against individuals go 
too far? Different countries answer the question in different 
ways — and so do different platforms. Those arguing for tight-
er crackdowns make familiar claims about threats, coordinat-
ed attacks, psychological abuse, and expressive harms. Those 
arguing against make equally familiar claims about political 
speech, counter-speech, chilling effects, and excessive sensi-
tivity.
Intellectual property. Section 230, for better or worse, 
carves out from its preemption “any law pertaining to intel-
lectual property.” But for better or worse, the First Amend-
ment also gives special deference to IP laws. The result is that 
invoking IP—particularly copyright—is a common plaintiffs’ tac-
tic for avoiding §230. Some of this is boundary work: the IP 
fields have their own frameworks for dealing with secondary 
liability (e.g., §512). But there is also an interesting subconsti-
tutional leveling taking place within IP: recent expansions in 
fair use are equally available to online and offline defendants.
Rules vs. standards. Very few platforms protected by 
§230 allow all of the speech they legally could. But policies 
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible speech 
(e.g. spam vs. ham), and policies backed up with sanctions 
(e.g., account deletion) raise familiar jurisprudential prob-
lems. In First Amendment terms, platforms and their critics 
worry about overbreadth, underinclusion, vagueness, and 
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discriminatory enforcement. Case in point: Twitter’s endless 
struggle to develop a workable harassment and hate speech 
policy and make it stick.
Contemporary community standards. The Internet’s 
breakdown of geographic barriers challenges the First 
Amendment’s reliance on local community norms to 
define obscenity. Section 230(e)(1) specifically defers to 
federal obscenity laws, so online platforms have to live 
with that uncertainty. But even if they didn’t, the same 
problem recurs one level down: how much should a plat-
form allow for diverse and conflicting local norms about 
acceptable freedom of expression? Consider Reddit’s 
repeated near-meltdowns over the antics of “problem-
atic” subreddits like r/creepshots and r/TheDonald. Any 
sufficiently large and diverse platform must confront 
Godel’s Theorem of Liberalism: no social system can be 
both consistent and completely tolerant.
State action. One of the most important moving parts 
in the standard defense of strong First Amendment protec-
tions for noxious speech is that individuals can avoid most 
of it in practice because private actors are free to speak, 
listen, and convey speech as they choose. The state-action, 
public-forum doctrine, and government-speech doctrines 
may be confused and confusing, but they draw a crucial 
legal and normative line. Even if Internet platforms are 
currently clearly private for First Amendment purposes, 
they often regard themselves as having a responsibility to 
behave responsibly, which they define in ways that rely on 
traditionally public rule-of-law virtues like availability to all, 
neutrality, fair notice, and consistency.
Platform speech. Platforms are always ambivalent about 
the speech they carry: they want to be praised (and some-
times paid) for it, but they also don’t want to blamed for it. 
In the First Amendment context, every medium presents the 
issue of when a platform for others’ speech itself “speaks,” 
with all the attendant rights and responsibilities. Section 
230(c)(1) allows platforms to be extraordinarily hands-
off; §230(c)(2) lets them be extraordinarily hands-on; the 
combination of the two lets them be anywhere in between. 
Plaintiffs sometimes try to argue that one choice or another 
gives a platform an obligation to allow their speech or to 
remove someone else’s. These arguments usually fail — but 
there is a line here, and there has to be, because §230 by its 
very nature distinguishes between first-party and third-par-
ty speech. Perhaps the Roommates.com “contributes ma-
terially to the alleged illegality” test is messy for the same 
reasons that the First Amendment government-speech 
cases are messy.
Jurisdiction. Free speech issues are global, and different 
countries have different free speech norms. Anyone who 
speaks in a way accessible to people in more than one coun-
try has to contend with the differences. This is a context in 
which §230 may not make much of a difference. Any plat-
form with an international reach is going to have to contend 
with other countries’ more restrictive laws anyway, and 
those countries may not much care whether American free 
speech law acts at the constitutional or statutory level. The 
most important piece of the puzzle here may actually be the 
SPEECH Act, which explicitly incorporates §230 in making it 
hard to enforce foreign defamation judgments in the United 
States — helping give local American platforms the ability 
simply to ignore what other countries have to say.
* * *
Section 230, everyone agrees, singles out online speech 
for special solicitude. One dimension of this solicitude is 
familiar. By protecting online speech more robustly than 
offline speech, §230 is an example of what Eric Goldman 
calls “Internet exceptionalism.” Zeran confirmed that online 
speech intermediaries would be shielded from liability 
in cases where their offline counterparts would not, and 
much of the debate around §230 is over the wisdom of 
this choice. (Personally, I agree with Felix Wu: the risks of 
collateral censorship on Internet-scale platforms are serious 
enough that this special immunity is usually justified.
But at the risk of stating the obvious, the other half of 
the term also matters. Section 230 protects online speech, 
yes, but it also protects online speech. It is the 21st-century 
First Amendment. Like any true heir, it has received a great 
deal from its predecessor: not just the family fortune, but 
the family feuds as well.
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The Satellite Has No 
Conscience: §230 in a World 
of ‘Alternative Facts’
Section 230 of the CDA continues to be the 
right policy choice, but it is up to us to be critical 
readers, calling out untruths, highlighting and 
promoting that which is reliable and discrediting 
that which is not.
By Laura A. Heymann
T
wenty-one years after the enactment of the 
Communications Decency Act, from which §230 
survived, and 20 years after the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Zeran 
v. AOL, which set the standard by which §230 
was to be interpreted, an increasing number of voices are 
questioning §230’s scope. The concerns that motivated 
§230—balancing the flourishing of the Internet against the 
very real likelihood that some participants would use it for 
socially undesirable, hateful, or threatening behavior—con-
tinue to be relevant today. Indeed, what seems to be a rise 
in hate speech, false information, and threatening behav-
ior has suggested to some that the balance that Congress 
struck, and that the Fourth Circuit validated, should be 
reconsidered.
Section 230 states that “no provider or user of an inter-
active computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider” and that “no provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be held liable” on account of any 
good faith, voluntary actions to restrict access to material 
that the provider or user considers to be objectionable. In 
short, service providers may either publish the material of 
others or remove the material of others without risk of liabili-
ty as a publisher or speaker of that material. The assumption 
is that without such protections, and given the vast amount 
of user-generated content on the Internet, providers will 
blindly delete any material claimed to be objectionable rather 
than risk liability for making the wrong judgment. Section 
230 received its first major test when Kenneth Zeran sued 
America Online, seeking recompense for the harassment he 
suffered when unknown parties reacted to a false posting on 
the service claiming that a “Ken” at his business telephone 
number was selling offensive T-shirts relating to the Oklaho-
ma City bombing. The Fourth Circuit interpreted §230 to bar 
liability, given that AOL was not the author of the posting 
and despite AOL’s reported inaction in the face of Zeran’s 
requests to immediately remove the posting. (Disclosure: I 
served as in-house counsel at America Online for three years 
in the early 2000s.)
The events in Charlottesville, Virginia, on Aug. 12 provide 
a sobering moment to re-engage with these concerns. Some 
platform providers have since taken a more active role re-
garding hateful content on their services (with some deciding 
to cease providing service altogether to white supremacist 
groups and other hate groups), while some third parties, in 
a replay of what befell Kenneth Zeran, publicly misidentified 
participants in the aftermath of the march, leading to ha-
rassment and threats—all activities that, absent §230, could 
have given rise to service provider liability. These scenarios 
are further complicated by the fact that, as with the poster 
in Zeran’s case, the authors of the problematic content may 
remain forever unknown to those harmed, either because the 
injured party would not be able to satisfy the legal process 
courts typically require to disclose user identity information 
or because of incomplete recordkeeping on the part of the 
service provider. The combination of these two limitations, 
some might say, creates an even greater likelihood of bad 
behavior: service providers freed de jure from the specter of 
liability and users freed de facto from responsibility for their 
activity.
Yet §230 continues to be, I believe, the right policy 
choice. As a result of §230, millions of individuals can com-
municate with the world virtually instantaneously, without 
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supervision, editing, or permission. Section 230 gives us a 
world that provides hundreds of book, film, and restaurant 
reviews; warns us about unscrupulous businesses; gives us 
first-hand reporting from war zones and disaster areas; and 
helps us to understand the plight of individuals who would 
not feel comfortable sharing their stories through interme-
diaries. We have moved from a world in which there were 
fewer content producers and relatively more distributors to 
a world in which we have many online authors and relatively 
fewer online distributors. Absent §230, a service provider 
would be put in the position of a newsstand with an endless 
supply of unknown publishers seeking to have their papers 
put out for sale. The scale alone would require any reason-
able distributor to turn almost all of them away.
This means, for better or for worse, that more of the 
work on the Internet must be done by us. We cannot rely on 
an imprimatur of a newspaper publisher or a broadcast tele-
vision network for much of the information we read online. 
We must be critical readers, calling out untruths, highlight-
ing and promoting that which is reliable and discrediting 
that which is not. (Threats or other criminal behavior 
should, of course, be reported to and investigated by ap-
propriate authorities.) We must reject information dressed 
up in the validation of look and feel and recognize that 
speed sometimes comes at the cost of truth. These are all 
responsibilities that Congress anticipated in enacting §230 
by including in its findings its belief that the better policy is 
to leave control over the information they receive primarily 
in the hands of users so as to preserve the possibility of 
“true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities 
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellec-
tual activity” with “a minimum of government regulation.” 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran recognized that these 
findings were not simply rhetorical preamble but part and 
parcel of §230’s existence.
I say all of this this knowing that, as Kenneth Zeran 
discovered, we are often porous filters of information con-
veyed via the Internet, whether through inability, inexpe-
rience, inertia, or ignorance. The fourth player in Zeran’s 
story was KRXO Radio in Oklahoma City. Mark Fullerton, 
who co-hosted a morning drive-time radio show under the 
name Mark Shannon, was reportedly known for his “caustic 
observations” and “ridicule of his verbal targets;” he de-
lighted in the “heated opinions” he fomented. Shannon saw 
the AOL posting when a listener unknown to him forwarded 
it to him. He tried to e-mail “Ken” at the AOL screen name 
in the posting and discovered that the screen name was 
inactive. He decided not to call the telephone number in the 
posting because it was before business hours. Despite this 
complete lack of vetting, Shannon read parts of the post on 
air and encouraged listeners to call the number and “let the 
seller know what Oklahomans thought of him.” (During his 
deposition, Shannon acknowledged that had he talked to 
Zeran before the broadcast, he would not have broadcast 
the phone number.)
Kenneth Zeran sued Diamond Broadcasting, the radio 
station’s parent company, in a separate action in which, of 
course, §230 was not available to the defendant. Never-
theless, every claim was dismissed. Zeran, the court held, 
could not succeed on a defamation claim because he could 
not show that his reputation had been sullied. (No one 
who knew him heard the broadcast, and no one who heard 
the broadcast knew him.) He could not succeed on a false 
light claim or a claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress because the radio station’s employees had been 
careless but not reckless or intentionally tortious. An on-
air apology was apparently Kenneth Zeran’s total redress. 
(Mark Shannon, for his part, was fired in December 1999 
from a later broadcasting position, reportedly for a produc-
er’s offensive on-air comment about the Texas A&M bonfire 
tragedy that killed 12 students. The Oklahoman reportedly 
closed reader comments on the article about Shannon’s 
death in 2010 because of the offensive nature of some of 
the remarks.)
Kenneth Zeran’s story was rewritten largely because 
he pursued litigation. Although he lost his lawsuits against 
both AOL and Diamond Broadcasting, the opinions in those 
cases, and the publicity that surrounded them, confirmed 
for any reasonable reader that he was not the “Ken” of the 
posting on AOL and was, instead, the victim of a cruel hoax. 
But §230 had not then been tested, and filing today what 
we would now recognize as meritless litigation against a 
service provider cannot be the means of historical correc-
tion. So the burden is on us, as readers, to do better. As 
scholar Cathy Davidson writes, we must teach others “to 
be hypervigilant about veracity, analysis, critical thinking, 
historical depth, subterfuge, privacy, security, deception, 
manipulation, logic, and sound interpretation.” We should 
encourage service providers to consider the implications 
of their content policies. And we should engage in these 
efforts publicly, so that the Kenneth Zerans of the world can 
have the record, if not fully corrected, at least significantly 
amended.
This undertaking can sometimes seem, admittedly, like 
rowing against the current. What we should not do, howev-
er, is jettison the statute that almost certainly has kept the 
Internet as we now know it afloat, even as we know that this 
will bring both harms and benefits. Indeed, although these 
are incredibly difficult and, for the individuals involved, 
painful problems, they are not new ones. Section 230 was a 
response to the medium, not to the message. In his last pub-
lic speech, in 1964, Edward R. Murrow said, “The speed of 
communications is wondrous to behold. It is also true that 
speed can multiply the distribution of information that we 
know to be untrue. The most sophisticated satellite has no 
conscience. The newest computer can merely compound, at 
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speed, the oldest problem in the relations between human 
beings and, in the end, the communicator will be confront-
ed with the old problem of what to say and how to say it.” 
Section 230 recognizes that the satellite indeed has no 
conscience. We do, however, and if we acknowledge that we 
are better off with the satellite than without it, it falls on us 
to exercise that conscience as much as we are able.
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The Non-Inevitable Breadth 
of the ‘Zeran’ Decision
When Kenneth Zeran filed his complaint against 
America Online (AOL) in April 1996, the internet 
as we know it today did not exist.
By Samir C. Jain
W
hen Kenneth Zeran filed his complaint 
against America Online (AOL) in April 1996, 
the internet as we know it today did not 
exist. Numerous services that for many 
consumers are now integral to the inter-
net—such as Google, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and eBay—
either had not yet been developed at all or were in their 
infancy. At the same time, the interpretation of §230 was 
an issue of first impression. Section 230 had not received 
nearly the same attention as the rest of the Communi-
cations Decency Act (which itself was a single title in the 
broader Telecommunications Act of 1996), either during the 
legislative process or in the immediate legal aftermath, in 
which a Constitutional challenge to the act’s indecency re-
strictions was already well on its way to the Supreme Court.
In the face of this relatively clean slate, one key strategic 
consideration was how broadly to frame the case. It was not 
immediately evident that Congress had enacted a far-reach-
ing immunity in a one-sentence subsection—§230(c)(1)—in 
the midst of these other more prominent provisions. Such 
statutory immunity is relatively rare. By providing that “no 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provid-
ed by another information content provider,” had Congress in-
tended to preempt virtually all state tort and statutory causes 
of action against service providers, as well as non-criminal 
federal claims, for third-party content? Would such immuni-
ty apply even when a service provider knew of the unlawful 
content and intentionally chose to take no action?
At least in isolation, it was possible to construe §230(c)
(1) more narrowly. The terms “publisher or speaker” could 
be interpreted in a technical sense to refer to defamation 
law—libel is a published defamatory statement, while slander 
is a spoken defamatory statement. Moreover, as the legisla-
tive history makes clear, a significant impetus for §230 was 
overruling Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, which had 
held a service provider potentially liable for a user’s defama-
tory posting. And, although Zeran’s claim was for negligence, 
at bottom the case concerned allegedly defamatory content 
about Zeran, and, as the Fourth Circuit recognized, the label 
attached to the claim should not be determinative. Thus, the 
core of the case could have simply been that, because publi-
cation is an element of defamation, holding a service provider 
liable for defamatory third-party content necessarily treats 
it as a publisher of that content in derogation of §230. That 
would have been sufficient for AOL to prevail and left the 
ultimate breadth of the immunity for another day.
From the start, however, AOL understood the potential 
significance of §230 to the growth and development of 
the internet. Although immunity from defamation claims 
for third-party content would be helpful, the specter of 
other tort and statutory liability for all other claims still 
would have a chilling effect on the amount and types of 
content service providers might permit and create disin-
centives to self-regulation. Moreover, §230 clearly was 
about more than defamation. Given the context, Congress 
at minimum also intended to remove disincentives for 
self-regulation of indecent and similarly objectionable 
content. Further, the statutory exceptions for intellectual 
property, privacy, and federal criminal enforcement would 
have been unnecessary if the statutory immunity were 
confined to defamation. Accordingly, the briefs framed the 
case broadly, explaining that imposing liability on a service 
provider necessarily treats it as a “publisher or speaker” of 
third-party content and focusing on the statutory purposes 
and the practical implications that potential liability would 
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have for both free speech on the Internet and incentives 
for self-regulation.
Although the district court wrote a relatively narrow 
opinion in AOL’s favor “limited to the state law claim … 
asserted here,” the Fourth Circuit took a more expansive 
approach. Before turning to Zeran’s specific arguments, the 
court described the statute in sweeping terms. In language 
that was cited repeatedly in subsequent cases, the court 
explained that “by its plain language, §230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service 
providers liable for information originating with a third-par-
ty user of the service … lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred. And the 
court proceeded to discuss in detail how broad immunity 
was necessary to fulfill the purposes of the statute.
It is fortunate that the Fourth Circuit recognized the 
significance of §230 and chose to write such a defining 
opinion. The facts of Zeran—while involving a sympathetic 
plaintiff victimized for no apparent reason—made it easy to 
see the pernicious consequences if service providers could 
be held liable for third-party content. Some of the next 
few cases that arose, such as Doe v. AOL and Blumenthal 
v. Drudge, did not present the legal and policy issues as 
cleanly. The Zeran opinion provided an anchor that moored 
the decisions in those cases and many subsequent ones. 
Without the Zeran opinion, on the other hand, the case law 
might have evolved in a much messier way and not provided 
the same certainty and assurance that has been so import-
ant in fostering the growth of so many internet services.
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The Judge Who Shaped  
the Internet
The outcome in ‘Zeran v. America Online’ is not 
entirely a result of the facts of the case. Section 
230 caselaw might look very different today had 
other judges been assigned to ‘Zeran v. America 
Online’.
By Jeff Kosseff 
T
he conventional wisdom about §230 is that the 
tech sector is lucky that Zeran v. America Online 
was the first federal appellate decision to inter-
pret the statute. By affirming the dismissal of 
Ken Zeran’s lawsuit against America Online, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set a precedent 
that would be difficult for other federal and state courts to 
overlook. A case involving circumstances that were even 
more tragic than Zeran’s might have resulted in a different 
first interpretation of §230.
But the outcome in Zeran v. America Online is not entirely 
a result of the facts of the case. Section 230 caselaw might look 
very different today had other judges been assigned to Zeran v. 
America Online. In particular, then-Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkin-
son III’s authorship of the Zeran opinion was crucial.
Like other circuits, the Fourth Circuit randomly assigns 
three judges to a panel that reviews briefs, hears oral argu-
ments, and issues decisions. The three judges assigned to the 
Zeran case were Donald S. Russell, a former South Carolina 
governor and U.S. Senator appointed by President Nixon in 
1971; North Carolina district judge Terrence Boyle, a former 
assistant to Republican Sen. Jesse Helms who was sitting on 
the Fourth Circuit by designation; and Wilkinson.
At first glance, Wilkinson might not appear to be the most 
likely candidate to articulate robust online speech rights 
that would endure for decades. Wilkinson had served in the 
Reagan Justice Department, and was appointed to the Fourth 
Circuit by Reagan in 1984. Overall, Wilkinson had the reputa-
tion of a reliable conservative jurist.
But there was one tidbit in his biography that might 
provide some hope for the lawyers defending America Online: 
before joining the Justice Department, Wilkinson was the edi-
torial page editor of the Virginian Pilot newspaper in Norfolk. 
And since joining the court, he has issued strong opinions in 
favor of free speech protections that often deviate from the 
rulings of other Republican appointees. In some cases, his 
First Amendment views have been stronger than those of 
solidly liberal jurists.
Wilkinson’s first major statement about free speech came 
less than three years after he joined the Fourth Circuit. In 
1986, a panel of three Fourth Circuit judges (not including 
Wilkinson), affirmed a verdict against the publisher of Hustler 
magazine stemming from a parody of the plaintiff, Rev. Jerry 
Falwell. Hustler asked the full Fourth Circuit to review the 
three-judge panel’s opinion.
The Fourth Circuit declined to rehear the case, and Wilkin-
son issued a blistering dissent from the denial. Hustler, he 
acknowledged, is “a singularly unappealing beneficiary of First 
Amendment values and serves only to remind us of the costs 
a democracy must pay for its most precious privilege of open 
political debate,” Wilkinson wrote. Nonetheless, he wrote, the 
First Amendment prevents public figures such as Falwell from 
recovering damages from a magazine due to the publication of 
a parody. The panel’s opinion “surely will operate as a powerful 
inhibitor of humorous and satiric commentary and ultimately af-
fect the health and vigor of all political debate,” Wilkinson wrote.
The Supreme Court agreed with Wilkinson. Writing for a 
unanimous court in 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed 
the panel decision.
Also in 1988, Wilkinson joined a unanimous three-judge 
panel opinion that affirmed the Espionage Act conviction of 
a former Navy employee who sent top-secret satellite infor-
mation about Soviet naval preparations to an English defense 
publication. The court’s opinion, written by Judge Russell, 
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swiftly dismissed the defendant’s claims that his conviction 
violated the First Amendment.
Wilkinson agreed with the ultimate outcome, but he 
wrote a separate concurring opinion to stress the impor-
tance of the First Amendment, even in national security 
cases. “I do not think the First Amendment interests here 
are insignificant,” Wilkinson wrote. “Criminal restraints on 
the disclosure of information threaten the ability of the 
press to scrutinize and report on government activity. There 
exists the tendency, even in a constitutional democracy, 
for government to withhold reports of disquieting develop-
ments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to 
itself. Public debate, however, is diminished without access 
to unfiltered facts.”
A few years later, Judge Wilkinson wrote an opinion 
reversing a defamation and invasion of privacy judgment 
against a trade publication brought by the subject of one of 
its articles, a whistleblower who had worked at the Nation-
al Cancer Institute. The court held that the whistleblower 
was a public figure who, under the First Amendment, must 
demonstrate that the publication acted with actual malice, a 
very high standard.
“It would be ideal if the truth or falsity of every charge 
could be instantly determined by the press,” Wilkinson 
wrote. “Unfortunately, however, truth or falsity is often not 
instantly ascertainable. In the hurly burly of political and 
scientific debate, some false (or arguably false) allegations 
fly. The press, however, in covering these debates, cannot be 
made to warrant that every allegation that it prints is true.”
True to his newspaper roots, many of Wilkinson’s 
opinions recognize the need for strong legal protections 
for the media to be a watchdog of the government. For 
instance, during the 1998 elections, the weekly St. Mary’s 
Today newspaper in Maryland was particularly critical of 
political allies of the county sheriff. On the night before the 
election, off-duty sheriff’s deputies visited 40 stores and 
40 news boxes and bought out the copies of the newspaper. 
The newspaper sued the sheriff and other county officials, 
alleging a violation of the First Amendment. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the defendants. In a 
2003 opinion, Judge Wilkinson wrote a unanimous opinion 
reversing the district court.
“The incident in this case may have taken place in 
America, but it belongs to a society much different and 
more oppressive than our own,” Wilkinson wrote. “If we 
were to sanction this conduct, we would point the way for 
other state officials to stifle public criticism of their policies 
and their performance.”
Unlike Wilkinson’ other free-speech cases, Zeran did not 
require him to apply the First Amendment; his decision was 
based entirely on his interpretation of §230. Yet Wilkinson 
managed to make similarly strong pronouncements about 
free speech, even when applying an obscure new communi-
cations statute.
Wilkinson read §230 as accomplishing Congress’s broad 
goal of fostering free and open online speech. “The amount 
of information communicated via interactive computer 
services is therefore staggering,” he wrote. “The specter of 
tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have 
an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service 
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for 
possible problems.”
Zeran, like Wilkinson’s other opinions, recognized a 
strong free speech right. But the result was not entirely 
predictable. In fact, Wilkinson’s background as a journalist 
might have made him more likely to rule in favor of Zeran. 
America Online was asking Wilkinson to recognize free 
speech rights for Internet companies that exceeded the 
protections of the First Amendment. When Wilkinson was 
editorial page editor, his newspaper did not receive the 
same protection for printing letters to the editor that Amer-
ica Online was seeking in Zeran’s case. Why should America 
Online receive immunity that the Virginian Pilot does not 
receive?
Still, Wilkinson continued his track record as a defend-
er of free speech, even in a new medium. Another judge, 
working from a blank slate with no other appellate court 
interpretation of §230, might have adopted a much narrow-
er view of §230. The judge could have agreed with Zeran’s 
lawyers that §230 no longer immunized online services 
once they received notice of illegal user content.
But once the Fourth Circuit issued Wilkinson’s opinion, 
it was impossible for other judges to ignore. In some of the 
early court rulings interpreting §230, judges reluctantly 
immunized online services for claims arising from user 
content.  They cited Zeran and ultimately agreed with the 
outcome, but not always with the same level of enthusiasm 
as Wilkinson.
For instance, five months after the Fourth Circuit ruled 
against Zeran, District of Columbia federal judge Paul L. 
Friedman dismissed a defamation case against America On-
line filed by a former Bill Clinton aide. America Online had 
provided users with access to Drudge Report, which alleged 
that the aide had abused his wife. Section 230, Friedman 
ruled, required him to dismiss the case. He relied heavily on 
Wilkinson’s Zeran opinion, including a block quote from the 
opinion of more than 250 words.
But Friedman appeared unhappy with the outcome. He 
wrote that §230 is “some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrange-
ment” between Congress and service providers.
“Because it has the fight to exercise editorial control 
over those with whom it contracts and whose words it 
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the 
liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a 
book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied 
to a distributor,” Friedman wrote. “But Congress has made 
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a different policy choice by providing immunity even where 
the interactive service provider has an active, even aggres-
sive role in making available content prepared by others.”
Had a judge who shared Friedman’s reservations about 
§230 been the first to issue a binding interpretation of the 
statute, the next two decades of §230 precedent—and the 
landscape of the Internet—might have been quite different.
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Zeran’s Failed Lawsuit 
Against an Oklahoma Radio 
Station
Bodies of the victims of the April 19, 1995, 
bombing of the A. P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City were still being removed from 
the rubble on April 25 when an anonymous 
post appeared on AOL advertising “Naughty 
Oklahoma T-Shirts” for sale.
By Robert D. Nelon
B
odies of the victims of the April 19, 1995, bombing 
of the A. P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City were still being removed from the rubble on 
April 25 when an anonymous post appeared on 
AOL advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts” for 
sale. The post used the screen name “Ken ZZ03” and said 
that items could be purchased by calling a Seattle phone 
number and asking for “Ken.” Similar posts advertising 
T-shirts and other items, from screen names “Ken ZZ033” 
and “Ken Z033,” appeared during the few days following. 
Each of the posts listed the same Seattle phone number 
and directed a caller to “Ask for Ken.” The phone number 
belonged to Ken Zeran, a Seattle resident who knew noth-
ing about the posts.
The T-shirts being advertised bore tasteless slogans re-
ferring to the bombing (among the least offensive was “Visit 
Oklahoma–It’s a Blast”). Needless to say, AOL users were ap-
palled–more accurately, angry–at the posts. So many decided 
to call “Ken” at the Seattle number and share their disgust 
that the phone rang incessantly for weeks, gradually tapering 
off in mid–May after local press in Oklahoma City exposed the 
postings as a cruel hoax using fake AOL accounts.
Around May 1, an AOL user emailed a copy of the April 25 
post to Mark Shannon, who co–hosted a morning–drive talk 
show called “Shannon and Spinozi” on “classic rock” radio 
station KRXO in Oklahoma City. Shannon read the post on the 
air on May 1, including the Seattle phone number, and he and 
Spinozi expressed their views about the crude person who 
would post something so offensive online. They urged KRXO 
listeners to call the Seattle number, “ask for Ken,” and tell Ken 
what they thought of him. Zeran, of course, didn’t hear the 
broadcast, but he heard from lots of callers who did. Zeran 
called the KRXO general manager and, after learning of the 
content of the AOL post, demanded a retraction. The station 
didn’t do a retraction, but during drive time on the afternoon 
of May 1 and again the next morning, KRXO said that the man 
at the Seattle phone number claimed he was not connected 
to the AOL posts. That apparently didn’t satisfy Zeran; he 
sued KRXO, owned by Diamond Broadcasting, in January 
1996, four months before he sued AOL.
Zeran alleged in the suit, filed in federal court in Oklaho-
ma City, that the KRXO broadcast about the AOL post de-
famed him, invaded his privacy by placing him in an offensive 
false light, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on 
him. The station, of course, didn’t have a Section 230 defense, 
but it moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Zeran had 
failed to state a claim. The court denied the motion, saying 
that the complaint “barely satisfies” the federal pleading stan-
dards. After discovery, KRXO moved for summary judgment.
The court granted the summary judgment motion (19 F. 
Supp.2d 1249 (W.D. Okla. 1997)). As for Zeran’s defamation 
claim, the court said it didn’t need to deal with some of the 
subtleties of Oklahoma defamation law such as special dam-
ages or whether KRXO’s broadcast was “of and concerning” 
Zeran that were part of KRXO’s argument; the simple fact 
was that defamation law protected reputation, and the court 
bought into KRXO’s argument that Zeran couldn’t identify 
a single person in the world who thought less of him after 
the broadcast than they did before. The false light claim fell, 
too, because there was no evidence that at the time of the 
broadcast Shannon or KRXO knew or recklessly disregarded 
the fact the AOL post was a hoax, and Zeran’s proof of that 
“actual malice” was essential to his recovery. Finally, the 
intentional infliction claim was not supported by any evi-
dence, the court said, that Shannon’s publication of the AOL 
post was extreme and outrageous under the circumstances, a 
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requirement for recovery of damages under Oklahoma law. 
The court wrote that it sympathized with the unfortunate 
events Zeran experienced, but it concluded that he had no 
legal remedy against KRXO.
Zeran wasn’t satisfied with the district court’s judg-
ment, so he appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit. The appellate court was overly solicitous of 
Zeran–describing him as “an accomplished artist, photog-
rapher, and film maker”–but it was no more inclined to find 
him entitled to legal relief than was the district court. The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of Diamond 
Broadcasting (203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000)). With respect 
to the defamation claim, the circuit court affirmed on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that 
Zeran suffered any loss of reputation; no one who heard 
the broadcast or called him even knew his last name. It also 
affirmed on the ground mentioned only in passing by the 
district court (but that seemed to capture the attention of 
the appellate panel during oral argument): that the particu-
lar kind of defamation claim asserted by Zeran–slander per 
quod–required proof of special damages under Oklahoma 
law, and neither emotional distress nor de minimis medical 
expenses qualified.
Zeran’s false light and intentional infliction claims didn’t 
pass muster, either, in the Tenth Circuit. The court affirmed 
the judgment on the false light claim on the ground there was 
no evidence of reckless disregard of falsity; and it rejected 
Zeran’s call to employ a negligence fault standard in place of 
the “actual malice” requirement adopted by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court. (The Tenth Circuit declined to certify the 
question to the Oklahoma court.) The appellate court con-
cluded that there was no evidence that Shannon and Spinozi 
had actual knowledge of probable falsity of the AOL post, and 
the court said that such subjective actual knowledge could 
not be established by the proffer of expert testimony. The 
intentional infliction claim also failed, the Tenth Circuit said, 
because proof of reckless disregard of falsity was required 
for the IIED claim just like it was for false light. The court also 
concluded that as a matter of law that Zeran’s emotional 
distress was not so severe that a reasonable person should 
not be expected to endure it, a conclusion that was also fatal 
to the intentional infliction claim.
The Tenth Circuit gave KRXO a small bonus on top of 
affirming the judgment in its favor. The district court, saying 
it did not condone Shannon’s on–air commentary, denied 
an award of costs to KRXO. The station cross–appealed the 
denial of its costs motion. The appellate court, while recog-
nizing that an award of costs lies within the discretion of the 
district court, concluded that in this case the lower court 
had abused its discretion in denying costs because of the 
court’s personal disapprobation of the defendant’s conduct. 
The Tenth Circuit held “that the district court’s own view of 
extra–judicial conduct, which the law does not recognize as 
legally actionable, should play no part in the district court’s 
decision whether to override the presumption that the pre-
vailing party receives costs.”
The name Zeran will always be famously associated with 
his case against AOL, because the seminal decision broadly 
interpreting the protections of Section 230 had a universal 
impact beyond the affirmance of summary judgment in 
favor of KRXO in a traditional speech–based tort case under 
Oklahoma law. The Diamond Broadcasting case, however, 
at least for those in Oklahoma, will be remembered and 
appreciated as well. The case against KRXO started before 
Zeran sued AOL, and the Tenth Circuit did not render its 
opinion until 26 months after the Fourth Circuit issued the 
AOL opinion and nearly 19 months after the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied Zeran’s petition for certiorari. Zeran v. Dia-
mond Broadcasting is often cited by Oklahoma defendants 
in defamation and other cases for the helpful principles that 
underlie both the district court and Tenth Circuit opinions. 
In their own way, those pinpoint holdings in Diamond Broad-
casting are almost as impactful as the far–reaching decision 
in AOL. Zeran should be appreciated for having advanced 
the law the way he did; and in a strange way, First Amend-
ment practitioners and internet users should be thankful for 
the anonymous poster who used the Oklahoma City bomb-
ing to offend us all.
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The Chilling Effect Claims in 
‘Zeran v. AOL’
It is now possible to critically assess the 
chilling effect claims, asserted in the Fourth 
Circuit’s ‘Zeran’ decision, with more insight and 
understanding than at any time previously.
By Jonathon W. Penney
I
n the two decades since it was decided, Zeran v America 
Online has been extensively analyzed, criticized, as-
sessed and re-assessed by commentators, yet one of the 
Fourth Circuit’s central claims in the decision—that the 
“spectre” of tort liability on the internet would have an 
“obvious chilling effect”—has notably escaped more system-
atic study and evaluation, at least empirically. Despite the 
importance of these “chilling effect” claims to the court’s 
decision, this lack of empirical study is not altogether 
surprising. There has been strikingly little such systematic 
study of such chilling effect claims in various areas of law 
over the years. Part of the problem is that chilling effects 
are often subtle, difficult to measure, and require interdis-
ciplinary research and methods going beyond traditional 
legal analysis. Thus, Leslie Kendrick found in 2013, after 
reviewing existing literature, that empirical support for 
such chilling effect claims was “flimsy” and thus requiring 
more far study.
Today, this systematic empirical study has finally begun to 
take shape. Several recent studies have documented “chill-
ing effects” in different contexts, including my own work on 
surveillance related chilling effects, which received extensive 
media coverage last year, as well as a more recent study, 
examining the comparative dimensions of regulatory chilling 
effects online, which I wrote about recently in Slate. With 
these, and other recent empirical work, it is now possible to 
critically assess the chilling effect claims in Zeran with more 
insight and understanding than any time previously.
Drawing on this research, including new findings from my 
own recently published chilling effects research paper, I argue 
that the Fourth Circuit was right to raise chilling effect con-
cerns in this context but likely wrong about how they would 
arise.
Zeran was the first case wherein §230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act was raised as a defense, and has also 
turned out to be the most important and influential (e.g., it 
has been cited at least 1,400 times). The facts essentially 
involved a case of online harassment whereby an unidentified 
person posted on America Online (AOL)’s message board 
false and defamatory messages about the plaintiff Kenneth 
Zeran, who sued AOL for failing to remove the postings 
promptly on notice.
In dismissing Zeran’s lawsuit, the Fourth Circuit made two 
chilling effect claims. First, that the possibility or “spectre” of 
tort liability more generally, would have an “obvious chilling 
effect” as it would lead online service providers (OSPs) to 
restrict speech on their services as policing “millions” of 
postings for problems would be “impossible.” Second, liability 
on notice would similarly have a chilling effect on internet 
speech due to over-enforcement — because OSPs would be 
liable only for publishing and not removal, they would have an 
incentive to remove content or messages on notice, whether 
defamatory or not. The court did not cite social science or 
empirical research to support either assertion. And while 
there were some previous studies concerning libel chill when 
Zeran was decided (see Ciolli’s work for a discussion) there 
were none dealing with chilling effects in online contexts.
Though these two claims are framed slightly different-
ly—one speaks to tort liability more generally while the other 
concerns liability on notice—the central point of both is that 
OSPs, when faced with liability concerns arising from the 
activities of users of their services, will take steps to limit 
their exposure to liability by restricting those activities. Here, 
this would mean restricting and limiting internet speech, thus 
“chilling” it. Put succinctly, the OSP, through its liability con-
cerns, is the main source for any chilling effects on internet 
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speech.
As with many chilling effect claims, this assertion is 
difficult to assess because it would involve testing counter-
factuals—how does one test the proposition that but for the 
broad §230 immunity for online service providers found in 
Zeran there would have been a chilling effect on speech due 
to OSP restrictions? Or that but for removing liability even 
on notification, OSPs would have taken steps to limit and 
thus chill speech?
Fortunately, recent research on the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) arguably allow us to do just that. As 
with the defamatory content in Zeran, OSPs in the 1990s 
faced liability for copyrighted materials users posted on 
their services without authorization. But rather than §230’s 
blanket immunity approach to deal with this challenge, 
Congress instead enacted the DMCA, which employs a no-
tice-and-takedown system to enforce and police copyright 
online. Someone who believes their copyrights are being 
infringed can send a DMCA “takedown” notice to an OSP 
to have the content removed. Put simply, like the liabili-
ty-on-notice schemes rejected in Zeran because they would 
likely lead to a “chill” on internet speech, the DMCA pro-
vides OSPs with immunity so long as they remove infringing 
content promptly upon notice. In other words, the DMCA 
has, in ways, created the counterfactual regulatory state of 
affairs to test the chilling effect claims in Zeran.
So, is there any evidence or empirical support for the 
Fourth Circuit’s chilling effects concerns? On this count, 
the Fourth Circuit in Zeran was right to raise chilling effect 
concerns, but was wrong to predict that OSPs would pose 
the real threat to speech.
The Zeran court, as noted, was primarily concerned 
about OSPs restricting speech through a “liability on 
notice” regime and the “spectre” of liability it constitutes. 
There is certainly some evidence on this count, but the 
case is largely circumstantial. For example, there has 
long been anecdotal evidence of DMCA “abuse” whereby 
invalid, false or improper DMCA notices lead to content 
removal online, especially as automation is increasingly 
used for enforcement. Moreover, the “compliance” rate 
for DMCA notices, that is, the reported rate at which an 
OSP report removing content in response to notification is 
fairly high at various well known and popular OSPs. Goo-
gle, for example, removes websites or content either fuller 
or partially in response to DMCA takedown notices in 98 
percent of cases. Twitter, from January to June 2017, com-
plied with 75 percent of DMCA notices. WordPress reports 
removal in 61percent of cases. Those rates are not neces-
sarily a problem by themselves, though when combined 
with studies that have documented substantial percentag-
es of invalid or problematic DMCA notifications — like this 
2016 study by Jennifer Urban, Joe Karaganis and Brianna 
Schofield finding that 30 percent of DMCA notices had 
potential problems — then these rates and anecdotal 
instances may suggest OSPs are opting for removal, and 
thus speech restrictions, to avoid liability. Still, there is 
no “smoking gun” here, and more research would need to 
be done on OSP practices to substantiate chilling effect 
concerns like those of Fourth Circuit in Zeran.
But this is not the end of the story. In fact, there is rea-
son to suspect “liability on notification” schemes can have 
a noteworthy chilling effect on online activities, but the 
culprit is not the OSPs receiving the notifications, but the 
notifications themselves.
This is among the key findings I discuss in my new 
chilling effects research paper, published earlier this year, 
based on an empirical case study from my doctorate at 
the University of Oxford. The study involves an original 
first-of-its-kind survey, administered to over 1,200 U.S. 
based adult internet users, designed to explore different 
dimensions of chilling effects, threats and concerns on-
line by comparing and analyzing participant responses to 
hypothetical scenarios that, in theory, may cause chilling 
effects or self-censorship. The study’s findings suggested, 
among other things, that once internet users received a 
personal legal notice for content they had posted online, 
noteworthy percentages of internet users were less likely 
to speak or write about certain things online, less likely 
to share personally created content, less likely to engage 
with social media, and more cautious in their internet 
speech or search. In other words, there was a clear chill-
ing effect. And among all the scenarios studied, respons-
es suggested receiving a personal legal notice like this 
would have the greatest comparative chilling effect on 
people’s online activities. This is important as under the 
DMCA, and similar liability-on-notice regimes, the user 
posting the alleged illegal content, in addition to the OSP, 
receives a copy of the legal notice. These findings offer 
insights into the impact these legal notices, and the legal 
threat therein, have on individual internet users.
For example, in terms of online speech, 75 percent of 
respondents in the study indicated they would be “much 
less likely” (40 percent) or “somewhat less likely” (35 
percent) to “speak or write about certain topics online” 
after receiving a personal legal notice about something 
they had previously posted online. Similarly, 81 percent 
of respondents indicating they “strongly agreed” (50 
percent) or “somewhat agreed” (31 percent) with a state-
ment that they would be more cautious or careful about 
their online speech after receiving such a personal legal 
notice. There were similar findings suggesting a chilling 
effect on other activities beyond speech, including online 
search, content sharing, and social network engagement. 
I also found evidence of a form of indirect chilling effects 
where internet users suggested they would be less likely 
to speak or share when a friend in their online social 
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network had received a personal legal notice for content 
they had posted online.
When you combine these empirical insights as to the 
impact of these “liability notifications” like DMCA (or 
libel) notices with the reality that literally tens of mil-
lions of these notices are now being sent weekly due to 
automation, a starker picture emerges of a substantial 
and noteworthy chilling effect on internet speech, and a 
range of other online activities, likely stemming from this 
broader regulatory ecosystem. Moreover, the notion that 
fear of legal or similar threats may “chill” online activi-
ties is consistent with a range of recent and comparable 
chilling effect studies in different contexts.
The chilling effect concerns raised in Zeran were essen-
tial to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning as they were employed 
to justify rejecting alternatives to blanket immunity — like 
liability on notice. Years on, in light of new empirical studies 
on chilling effects, including my own, we are better situated 
to assess those claims. Today, the evidence suggests that 
the court’s concerns about chilling effects associated with 
“liability on notification” alternatives were sound. The court 
was just wrong on how they would arise.
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‘Zeran v. America Online’ 
and the Development of 
Trolling Culture
Twenty years ago the Fourth Circuit decided 
Zeran v. America Online, a decision which, on 
the positive side, made possible the internet 
we have today. On the negative side… it made 
possible the internet we have today.
By Aaron Schwabach 
‘T
he newest computer can merely compound, 
at speed, the oldest problem in the relations 
between human beings, and in the end the 
communicator will be confronted with the 
old problem, of what to say and how to say 
it.’ – Edward R. Murrow, quoted by Kenneth Zeran in “The 
Cultural High Road Along the Internet Landscape in The 
Pursuit of Happiness,” remarks at 15th Anniversary Confer-
ence of 47 Section 230 U.S.C.(a), March 4, 2011, Santa Clara 
High Tech Law Center.
Twenty years ago the Fourth Circuit decided Zeran v. 
America Online, a decision which, on the positive side, made 
possible the internet we have today. On the negative side… 
it made possible the internet we have today. The destruc-
tive culture of incivility and trolling are not an unavoidable 
consequence of a culture of near-universal online access, 
but a demonstration of the enormous power of law to shape 
society.
While the internet had existed in some form since the 
1960s, and consumer access through Prodigy, Compuserve, 
AOL, and others was already widely available in the 1980s, 
the internet as a mass medium of communication did not 
really catch on until the invention of the World Wide Web and 
easily-usable internet browsers in the early 1990s. Human 
beings being human, one of the early uses to which the new 
medium was put, like all new media before it, was pornogra-
phy. (Others, reflecting equally universal human values, were 
gaming, shopping, and politics.)
In the United States, the ease of online access to pornog-
raphy, fueled by, inter alia, Time magazine’s infamous “porn 
panic” cover–led to a demand from concerned voters that 
Congress do something. What Congress did was enact the 
Communications Decency Act, an idiotic piece of legislation 
that ignored the Miller test for obscenity and was, in due 
course, struck down by the Supreme Court.
Or mostly struck down. Section 230, protecting internet 
service providers (ISPs) from some forms of liability for con-
tent posted by their users, survived and remains part of US 
law to this day.
In the midst of the rapidly changing world of the 1990s 
came the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19 
children. The attack created universal outrage, which was 
especially intense in Oklahoma City.
Beginning six days after the bombing, someone using 
the name Ken ZZ03 began to post ads on AOL purporting to 
be from “Ken,” offering T-shirts for sale mocking the bomb-
ing and the victims and listing Kenneth Zeran’s home phone 
number. Zeran, fifteen hundred miles away in Seattle, began 
to receive harassing and threatening phone calls, which inten-
sified (from an already-high level of about one call every two 
minutes) after an Oklahoma City radio station, KRXO, broad-
cast the content of the first posting and urged listeners to call 
Zeran. Seattle police had to protect Zeran’s house.
Every year, when I teach Zeran, I ask students who they 
think posted the ads. Students are always quick to suspect an 
ex-lover or ex-spouse, or possibly a business rival or personal 
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enemy–and eventually come to the sobering realization that 
no motive was necessary: the poster might have been a 
bored teenager in Stuttgart or Canberra selecting Zeran to 
be the victim of a drive-by trolling. In other words, Kenneth 
Zeran could be any of us; some random stranger on the 
internet could decide to ruin another random stranger’s life 
for no reason other than entertainment.
Of course, such conduct is both criminal and tortious. 
However, locating the perpetrator may be difficult or im-
possible, and even if located the perpetrator may be judg-
ment-proof or otherwise unreachable. And while the malice 
of the original poster is the root cause of the harm, the 
harm would have been minimal without the wider audience 
provided by AOL and KRXO.
Zeran lost his suit against AOL both at trial and on ap-
peal. The outcome is unsurprising; §230 speaks so directly 
to this issue that the only surprise is that the case got as 
far as it did: “No provider or user of an interactive comput-
er service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider,” 47 U.S.C. sec. 230(c)(1). Both the trial court and 
the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the statute enacted by 
Congress; however, both went through considerable ago-
nizing in doing so, because the facts of the case were, to a 
mid-1990s world not yet inured to far more horrible internet 
trolling, horrific.
A single throwaway line in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion 
illustrates the enormous cultural distance between the 
world of 1997 and the world of 2017: “‘The Internet is an in-
ternational network of interconnected computers,’ currently 
used by approximately 40 million people worldwide.” Zeran, 
quoting Reno. Stop and think about that for a moment: 
Forty million users, out of a world population, at the time, 
of nearly six billion. In 1997 roughly one person out of every 
150 had access to the internet, and in almost all cases that 
access was slow and cumbersome, restricted to desktops 
with wired, usually dial-up, connections. The internet was 
new, rare, and frightening. Today more than half of the 
world’s population has internet access, and that access is 
often mobile, enabling users to be constantly online. In the 
developed world most people use multiple internet-connect-
ed devices on a daily basis; even in the least-connected con-
tinent–Africa–a third of the population has internet access 
(more than in the United States at the time of Zeran), and 
the widespread use of phone-sharing in Africa as a business 
model means that far more people probably have at least 
intermittent access.
Mass internet access was a disruptive event, uproot-
ing and replacing centuries-old industries, business mod-
els, and cultural norms. A different result in Zeran–say, 
a call for legislative change followed by a Congressional 
repeal of §230–would have slowed the growth of the 
internet and set it on a different path. ISPs would have 
had to devote resources to policing content and users, 
as well as devoting funds to insure themselves against 
the occasional malicious user, like Ken ZZ03, slipping 
through. Countless billions of dollars of economic growth 
would have been delayed or lost. The bulk of internet 
development might have shifted to other countries with 
their own legal equivalents of §230.
The trolling of Kenneth Zeran, as terrible as it was, 
seems almost quaint in light of what has come since, 
much as the online pornography–mostly slow-loading still 
images–that inspired the Communications Decency Act 
seems tame in comparison to the now-universal instant 
availability of hardcore pornographic videos that we have 
learned to accept as part of the background noise of 
our information society. Trolls now email grieving family 
members animated GIFs of accident victims, with cruel 
messages calculated to inflict emotional distress; they 
have driven emotionally vulnerable teenagers to suicide; 
they have rendered huge swathes of the gaming world 
unsafe for female gamers. This, too, we have learned 
to accept as more background noise. We convince our-
selves that Gamergate and 4chan, or their equivalents, 
are simply the price of progress. Horrors that had nearly 
vanished by the early 1990s, including child pornography 
and Nazism, have come back. Websites devoted to hate 
speech played a crucial role in the most recent presiden-
tial election and appear to have influence at the highest 
levels of government. In a pre-internet, pre-Zeran world 
there could never have been a President Donald Trump.
Slower, more carefully managed internet growth 
might have achieved the same economic and social bene-
fits without feeding the trolls. Zeran, though, was cor-
rectly decided; the fault lay not with the court, but with 
the sodden mess of political grandstanding and sloppy 
drafting that was the Communications Decency Act; in 
this case, bad laws made bad facts.
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‘Zeran v. AOL’: The Anti-
Circumvention Tool
Zeran v. AOL is the survivalist’s kit for websites.
By Maria Crimi Speth
I
f I were an expert survivalist who was offered one tool to 
survive alone in the elements, I would probably choose 
a fire starter … but maybe a knife, a pot, or duct tape. 
Really, I would want all of those items because no one 
tool has the versatility I would want. But, for an expert in 
defending website operators from against claims, choos-
ing one tool is easy. Zeran v. AOL is the survivalist’s kit for 
websites. Fortunately, lawyers almost never find ourselves 
in a situation where we can only cite one case. But if that 
were to happen, the Fourth Circuit’s thorough and well-rea-
soned decision in Zeran would likely be the one case I would 
choose.
Ever since Congress passed 47 U.S.C. §230, a federal law 
that says, “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any in-
formation provided by another information content provider,” 
creative lawyers have been searching for ways to circumvent 
the statute and nab website owners for the bad acts of their 
users. An often-made threat from attempted §230 circum-
ventors is “this case is different.” Some assertions I often 
hear as to why §230 won’t protect my client in their “unique” 
situation are that his client asked for removal of the offending 
content, her client’s business was destroyed, my client said 
it would remove the post, my client refused to identify the 
author, or my client edited the post. All of these claims were 
eradicated twenty years ago in a single court decision in the 
Zeran case.
The most sure-fire way to plead around §230 and at least 
survive an early motion to dismiss is to allege that the service 
provider is the “information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §230 
defines the information content provider as any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development of the content. Early case law, including 
Zeran, played a critical role in making clear that in order to be 
responsible for the creation or development of the content, 
the content had to originate with the service provider. “By 
its plain language, §230 creates a federal immunity to any 
cause of action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party use of the service.” 
Zeran at 330. Had the Fourth Circuit defined “responsible” 
for the “development” in a broader fashion, that may have 
changed the course of case law history. As noted by the 
Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), “It’s true 
that the broadest sense of the term ‘develop’ could include 
the functions of an ordinary search engine — indeed, just 
about any function performed by a website.” Citing the Zeran 
Court’s early guidance, courts have instead adopted a far 
narrower definition.
[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring not 
merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materi-
ally contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, 
a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls 
within the exception to section 230, if it contributes material-
ly to the alleged illegality of the conduct.
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167-68 (emphasis added)
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Jones v. Dirty World, 755 
F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014), again citing Zeran, to define the term 
development broadly “would defeat the purposes of the CDA 
and swallow the core immunity that §230(c) provides for the 
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions.”
When attempting to circumvent §230 in making claims 
against the host of a website, a popular argument is that the 
website that encourages or solicits the content is, therefore, 
responsible for the development of the content. This argu-
ment evolved from a strained reading of the Ninth Circuit’s 
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decision in Roommates and more directly from the Tenth’s 
Circuit’s holding that a service provider is responsible for 
the development of offensive content “if it in some way 
specifically encourages development of what is offensive 
about the content.” F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
Initially, this argument got some traction. Relying on 
Roommates and Accusearch, the District of Kentucky Court 
adopted an encouragement test holding that:
Although Courts have stated generally that CDA immu-
nity is broad, the weight of the authority teaches that such 
immunity may be lost. That is, a website owner who inten-
tionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party postings 
to which he adds his own comments ratifying or adopting 
the posts becomes a “creator” or “developer” of that con-
tent and is not entitled to immunity.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 965 F. Supp. 2d 
818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 755 F.3d 398 (6th 
Cir. 2014).
The encouragement test did not survive appeal though. 
The Sixth Circuit dealt it a death blow stating, “[w]e do not 
adopt the district court’s encouragement test of immunity 
under the CDA.” The Court explained that there is a crucial 
distinction between the traditional publisher actions that 
Zeran and other courts held were protected under §230 
and actual responsibility for what makes the displayed con-
tent illegal or actionable. Jones, 755 F.3d at 414.
Playing on the definition of development, another 
popular circumvention technique is to plead that a website 
operator is the information content provider because it ed-
ited the content. Here again, Zeran is the tool of choice. The 
Fourth Circuit held that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service 
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional 
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, 
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” Zeran at 
330. This language laid the ground work for later cases to 
hold that merely editing content does not make an inter-
active service provider the developer of the content and 
hence the information content provider, unless the service 
provider materially contributed to the alleged unlawful-
ness of the content. Indeed, every published case that has 
rejected the argument that editing, altering, modifying, 
and deleting content makes the service provider an infor-
mation content provider, has cited the Zeran case. See Doe 
v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.N.H. 
2008); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, 206 F.3d 980, 986 
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 
(D.D.C. 1998).
The versatility of Zeran as a tool is perhaps best illus-
trated through the fact that it has been cited at least 259 
times by other courts. Section 230 itself has been cited 645 
times, meaning that Zeran has been cited in 40 percent of 
all §230 cases. So if you find yourself stranded on a virtual 
island fending off enemy attacks, turn to the well-trusted 
leader in protecting websites as your best survival tool.
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The UK’s Broad Rejection of 
the §230 Model
When President Clinton signed the 
Communication Decency Act, online 
pornography—and not defamation—was the focus 
of debate. However, in Reno v. American…
By Gavin Sutter
W
hen President Clinton signed the Communi-
cation Decency Act, online pornography—and 
not defamation—was the focus of debate. 
However, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme 
Court struck down the pornography provisions, leaving 
§230’s protections from liability arising from third-party 
content.
On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the United 
Kingdom took a very different approach to online defamation. 
While the average British Parliamentarian may have had little 
experience of the internet at this time (by 2000, still only 
approximately one third of Westminster MPs were making use 
of the email facilities provided to them), concerns were raised 
about the Internet from early stages.
It would seem logical that the pronounced divergence 
between US and UK law in this regard was influenced by the 
context in which each first appeared: whereas Congress was 
seeking to shield service providers and intermediaries with 
the hope they would be emboldened to seek out pernicious 
sexual content and remove it from their systems, the UK 
instead saw the question of liability for third party provided 
libelous content in a pure defamation setting.
Much before 1995, legal academics speculated that the 
UK would go in much the same direction as the early US cas-
es of Cubby v. CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 
with liability being determined on the basis of awareness and 
potential for control. In Parliament, a Draft Defamation Bill 
was issued for public consultation in July 1995 by then Lord 
Chancellor, Baron Mackay of Clashfern. Mackay’s commen-
tary in the consultation document made much of the rise of 
new technology via which “[i]nformation can be disseminat-
ed in a form which gives the recipient the option to convert 
it to a readable form, either presented on a VDU screen, 
or printed on the recipient’s own printer”, before intoning, 
darkly: “Progress is now so rapid, that tomorrow’s technology 
may well make even these advances appear old fashioned.” 
Nonetheless, Mackay, and subsequently Parliament, felt that 
in principle the pre-existing common law defense of innocent 
dissemination (Emmens v. Pottle) could and should be set on 
a statutory footing, in a form which applies to Internet inter-
mediaries. Thus, on July 4, 1996, just a few months after the 
CDA came into force, the Royal Assent was given to a very 
different legal rule.
Under §1 of the Defamation Act 1996, any person other 
than the author, editor or publisher—that is, any secondary 
distributor, including online parties—who is found to have 
either been actually aware, or in a position in which the court 
considers they should, objectively, have been aware, of a 
defamatory statement published via their channels, will face 
legal liability for publication of a defamatory statement.
The first ruling on the matter came in the form of an early 
hearing on whether the §1 defense would be available to an 
ISP which was hosting a Usenet newsgroup on which a defam-
atory posting had appeared. In Godfrey v. Demon, Morland J 
ultimately ruled that a single, defamatory posting buried in 
an otherwise innocuous newsgroup, one of many hundreds 
of thousands of pages hosted but not edited or in any way 
monitored by the ISP, would not be something of which the 
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defendant should have been aware until actual notice had 
been received. Godfrey had complained several times about 
the defamation, but Demon had failed to remove it until the 
system automatically deleted the post in question some ten 
days after it was first made. This actual notice would, Mor-
land ruled, render the defense unavailable to Demon at full 
trial. The ISP consequently settled the case, paying Godfrey 
a reported £15,000 in damages and a further £485,000 
costs.
In 2002, the UK enacted domestic legislation incorpo-
rating §4 of the European Electronic Commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC, which further entrenched the awareness-based 
approach to online service provider liability for third-party 
content by expanding it beyond defamation, to cover all 
forms of unlawful content, both civil and criminal.
By comparison, across this period in the US, §230 as ap-
plied in Zeran v. AOL went from strength to strength, both 
in terms of whom it protected, from traditional online hosts, 
to website hosts of third party reviews, even non-commer-
cial emailing lists and reposting of bulletin board posts, and 
in terms of the legal claims it immunized. Not only defama-
tion, but also the provision of false stock information, dis-
criminatory third-party comments in breach of fair housing 
laws, and even the marketing of obscene photographs of a 
minor in a chatroom.
One of the very few exceptions to the scope of §230 
remained intellectual property law—copyright in particu-
lar, which had its own, awareness-based regime under the 
DMCA (and on which many have commented with regards to 
what this may say about relative lobbying strengths viz-a-
vis Congress).
Whereas in the US there have been a whole slew of 
cases in which various defendants have successfully applied 
the §230 defense, the UK equivalents under the Defamation 
Act 1996 and the Ecommerce Regulations 2002 have pro-
duced very few reported cases. Instead, critics of the UK’s 
position claim that British ISPs, rather than risk liability, 
simply remove material at the simplest complaint, and thus, 
they argue, these laws provide a clear chill upon freedom of 
expression.
There is an absence of conclusive academic research 
supporting these claims. Certainly, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that generally UK ISPS do make some effort to 
determine the legitimacy of complaints, while some, such 
as the UK arm of the Facebook behemoth, are notoriously 
arbitrary with what they consider to be perfectly acceptable 
pursuant to their “community standards.” Nonetheless, 
many in the internet industry continued to feel that inter-
mediaries were being unfairly required to decide whether 
material was unlawful and should be removed, with serious 
consequences should they make a wrong decision. As one 
former Demon staffer memorably and venomously put it 
during an academic conference, “We have people to make 
these decisions for us: we call them courts.”
Nonetheless, little changed in the UK position until the 
launch of the Libel Reform Campaign in 2009, with its man-
ifesto Free Speech Isn’t Free. The LRC, comprised of various 
interest groups led by Index on Censorship and English PEN, 
called for numerous reforms of English defamation law, 
some more desirable than others.
One early proposed reform was for internet interme-
diaries to be immunized from all forms of liability for third 
party content. This was never going to be a popular idea 
among many lawyers or Parliamentarians, who by and large 
saw that §230, rather than encouraging service providers 
to be proactive, simply emboldened them to shrug and do 
nothing in response to claims of defamation. Further, as the 
LRC may have realized had they given the specific matter 
a little further legal research ahead of their initial report, 
the UK’s commitments under EU law provided a framework 
within which any changes here would be required to oper-
ate.
In the end, the eventual Defamation Act 2013 produced 
what might be termed a very British compromise. Section 
10 provides that secondary distributors, including internet 
intermediaries, cannot be subject to legal action “unless the 
court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an 
action to be brought against [those directly responsible for 
its publication]”.
Further, §5 provides a defense for “operators of web-
sites”. While the term is not defined, it would seem designed 
to encompass anyone who runs a social media site, a blog 
platform, a BBS or any form of website to which individu-
als can post content (as distinct from traditional, passive 
mere-hosting).
As first published, the defense seemed to make little 
sense, and add nothing to the pre-existing legal position. 
In essence, it provides that it is a defense for the website 
operator to show that the disputed content was provided by 
a third party. The defense is lost where the website oper-
ator acts maliciously, or where the client has been unable 
to identify the actual source of the defamatory posting, 
and has notified the operator, who has failed to respond “in 
accordance with any provision contained in regulations.”
As ever, God (or, depending on one’s view of the provi-
sions therein, and /or theology, the Devil) is in the details. 
The Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013 
(which followed some months after the Act) set out a clear 
notice and takedown procedure which, if followed, will shield 
the Operator from liability. In essence, on receipt of a clear 
notice which properly identifies the content complained of, 
the Operator has a set period during which to respond, to 
contact the source of the contested posting to see if they 
wish to defend the content, and set circumstances in which 
the posting must either be deleted, or may be left alone.
While in some respects (all 48 hours and five days, not 
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counting weekends, bank or public holidays) these time 
limits can rapidly begin to resemble Biblical numerology, 
the instructions are clear, simple, and should avoid much 
difficulty and expensive litigation for website operators in 
future. In spirit, they are not dissimilar to the reposting pro-
visions to be found in the US DMCA under §512(g), although 
somewhat less complicated. Also, the §5 defense makes 
clear that standard content moderation practices do not 
constitute editing for the purposes of defamatory liabili-
ty. Elsewhere, I have argued that this approach should be 
broadened to encompass all areas of civil law with regards 
to third party content online.
Though I’m very happy with the ‘third way’ approach 
that the UK has evolved in relation to service provider liabil-
ity for third party provided defamatory content as distinctly 
different from §230 as applied by Zeran, to date this rule 
applies only in one of the UK’s three legal jurisdictions, that 
of England and Wales. In 2013, the responsible minister in 
the Northern Ireland Assembly’s arcane, power-sharing 
government elected not to adopt the new Defamation Act 
into Northern Ireland law, officially stating that he would 
“wait and see” how effective it proved in England and Wales. 
There has since been much speculation about this decision, 
but little progress as a series of unfortunate circumstanc-
es have once more collapsed the devolved government in 
Northern Ireland for the time being.
In the UK’s other jurisdiction, Scotland—where, unlike 
Northern Ireland, defamation law has long been markedly 
different than that in England—the Scottish Law Commis-
sion has, following a 2016 public consultation on defa-
mation law reform, recently issued a draft Defamation 
and Malicious Publications (Scotland) Bill. Significantly, 
§3 provides that there are to be “no proceedings against 
secondary publishers”; exceptions to this general rule 
will only be made in respect of specific categories of 
secondary publisher to be determined by Scottish Min-
isters, granted authority to do so by §4. Distributors so 
identified will be subject to awareness based liability in 
exactly the same manner as under §1 of the Defamation 
Act 1996. What categories of secondary publisher may be 
exempted from liability and which will face liability, under 
what ministerial regulations, remains as of yet unspec-
ified. Scotland could, if this model is taken forward into 
law, end up with a hybrid system between those with a 
§230 style ‘get out of jail free card’ immunity, and those 
subjected to something akin to the new English third-
way approach. With existing EU obligations in this regard 
seemingly on borrowed time as the UK rushes towards 
the Brave New Post-Brexit World, it seems that Scotland’s 
options will soon be wide open. In Autumn 2017, the UK’s 
broad approach may be one of rejecting the §230 style of 
immunity, but by Autumn 2037, who knows?
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‘AOL v. Zeran’: The 
Cyberlibertarian Hack of 
§230 Has Run Its Course
‘Zeran’ has been the authority for 20 years; we 
need a judicial opinion or legislative enactment 
that better balances the statutory objective 
with the original congressional intent to protect 




wenty years ago, in AOL v. Zeran, a three-judge 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that 47 U.S.C. §230 immunized de-
fendant AOL from liability for hosting and failing 
to block a user’s mendacious electronic bulletin 
board posts about plaintiff, even after AOL received no-
tice of the existence of the offending posts on its servers. 
This was the first federal appeals court opinion to define 
the scope of protection under the Communications Decen-
cy Act. This reason alone made the decision and opinion 
significant. But the Zeran opinion was most notable for its 
conclusion: an online intermediary may not be held liable 
for third-party user-generated content, even when it knows 
that the content is unlawful.
This was an exceptional treatment under law. Generally, 
under longstanding tort principles, publishers are as liable 
for distributing material that they know to be unlawful as the 
original author. But, for the panel, the online services could 
not be treated in the same way; the internet is different. With-
out immunity, it explained, intermediaries would be exposed 
to “liability for each message republished by their services.” 
That kind of exposure “would have an obvious chilling effect.” 
“Each notification” of objectionable content, the panel elab-
orated, “would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the 
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal 
judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character, 
and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability 
by allowing the continued publication of that information.” 
Section 230’s purpose, the Fourth Circuit observed, was to 
preserve the internet as an open forum for expression and 
commerce. Imposing intermediary liability for the bad acts of 
third-party users would undermine that purpose.
Twenty years later, we can safely say that the Zeran 
formulation has helped to foster diversity and abundance 
of user-generated online content. In this regard, it has given 
effect to one of Congress’s chief objectives for §230.
But as the Zeran approach has aged, so has its perti-
nence, for the worse. Many of the search engines, social me-
dia and online marketplaces that benefit from the protection 
today do far more than serve as “publisher[s] or speaker[s] of 
any information provided by another information content pro-
vider.” The largest and most popular application developers 
do so much more with their users’ content and data. Google, 
Facebook and Amazon, for example, do not just publish or 
edit user content. They design the ways by which their users 
share information; they analyze and algorithmically sort that 
information; and they repurpose and commercialize the data 
in ways that are opaque to most consumers. To talk of pub-
lisher or notice liability in this context is quaint and inappo-
site. It is time that courts attend to the ways in which online 
intermediaries design their services, rather than reflexively 
apply publisher liability doctrine.
The Zeran panel also understated (if not misstated) the 
Good Samaritan purpose of the statute. While it recognized 
the important statutory objective of “self regulation,” it also 
speculated that intermediaries would be reluctant to “screen 
material” because doing so “would only lead to notice” which, 
in turn, would “create a stronger basis for liability.” To be 
sure, subsequent opinions by federal courts and state courts 
of last resort pointedly declined to give the Good Samaritan 
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language in §230(c)(2) real effect. But they cited Zeran as 
authority. As the first to take up the statute, the Zeran pan-
el’s failure to elaborate the “good faith” language in ways 
that better achieved the self-regulation objectives of the 
statute was consequential.
Today, in an irony of ironies, under the Good Samaritan 
safe harbor, intermediaries do not gain anything from polic-
ing their users’ content. Many prominent ones do, of course. 
But many do not. This has been especially troublesome with 
regard to services that knowingly host or encourage unlaw-
ful user content, including and especially those that mate-
rially harm vulnerable people and historically subordinated 
groups. User-generated nonconsensual porn, advertise-
ments that promote the trafficking of minors, and targeted 
advertisements that violate laws against racial discrimina-
tion in housing and employment are the most notorious ex-
amples. Legislators have proposed amendments to redress 
some of these developments. But it is not at all clear they 
will succeed; the proposals face substantial pushback from 
the most powerful application developers.
Now is as good a time as any to recognize the Fourth 
Circuit’s definitive contribution to the development of the 
internet generally. In light of today’s state of affairs, how-
ever, it is plain that the Zeran framework, the prevailing 
approach to §230 today, needs substantial retooling.
To be fair, as with most judicial opinions, the Zeran opin-
ion was a creature of its time. In the mid- to late-1990s, writ-
ers, business leaders, futurists and cyberprofs were breath-
less and giddy about how the internet would transform the 
way in which users learn, develop relationships, govern 
themselves, and transact business. These early evangelists 
promised that the internet would upturn or unsettle existing 
laws, geopolitical boundaries, and government bureaucra-
cies. Their excitement expressed itself in ways that sounded 
every bit like the deregulatory, free-market worldview in 
vogue at the time. (Compare, for example, President Bill 
Clinton’s pronouncement in the 1996 State of the Union Ad-
dress that “the era of big government is over” with the 1994 
manifesto, “Cyberspace and the American Dream,” which 
asserted that governments in the coming era “will be vastly 
smaller (perhaps by 50 percent or more) than the current 
one — this is an inevitable implication of the transition from 
the centralized power structures of the industrial age to 
the dispersed, decentralized institutions” of the networked 
world.) Never mind that this worldview has rightfully always 
been received with suspicion by people and groups that 
have relied on zealous federal government oversight to 
protect them from corporate abuses and insidious forms of 
systemic discrimination. In retrospect, the argument for a 
hands-off approach to online content arose from a naïve or 
indulgently ideological conceit that has not born itself out. 
Just consider that the largest intermediaries are acquiring 
far reaching services in new markets and making their po-
sitions in the economy and public life indispensable. Along 
the way, they are pushing the limits of competition law and 
adjudicating in the first instance which kinds of user infor-
mation to distribute.
Surely, we could be forgiven for believing that, in its fail-
ure to elaborate the Good Samaritan safe harbor, the Zeran 
panel was shortsighted or, worse, taken by cyberlibertarian 
triumphalism. Many people were.
In fact, the Zeran panel was tasked with a difficult 
responsibility: promoting free expression on the one hand 
and encouraging intermediaries’ “self regulation” of objec-
tionable speech on the other. It was to do this through the 
doctrinal lens of publisher liability doctrine. Zeran argued 
that, while the statute identifies “publishers,” it says noth-
ing about distributors. This distinction matters, he posited, 
because Congress presumably meant to keep distributor lia-
bility (or notice liability) fully applicable. The panel, however, 
rejected the argument, explaining that distributor liability 
“is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and 
is therefore also foreclosed by §230.” Plaintiff’s argument 
failed, it explained, because “[l]iability upon notice would 
defeat the dual purposes advanced by §230,” creating “an 
impossible burden” for online services.
This holding ended the panel’s substantive analysis of 
the scope of immunity under §230, but should not have. 
Even while its conclusion may have been correct, the hold-
ing begs the question about the Good Samaritan language 
in §230(c)(2), a provision that invites courts to consider 
services’ responsiveness to block or removal requests. The 
provision asserts that intermediaries may not be held liable 
for voluntarily taking steps “in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of … objectionable” content. Relying on 
this protection, the panel could have determined whether, 
as pled by Zeran, AOL acted in good faith in its handling of 
the unlawful content. The outcome might have been the 
same, but the rule would have been narrower and more 
consistent with both objectives of the statute. But the panel 
downplayed the significance of the “good faith” “self regula-
tion” safe harbor, privileging the interest in promoting free 
expression and commerce.
A narrower rule would have been more adaptable to dif-
ferent business models — even those of today. It would have, 
on the one hand, imposed the obligation on applications to 
act in good faith when adverting a policy against unlawful 
content and, on the other hand, protected applications that 
serve as true publishers or distributors. The problem of true 
passive intermediaries knowingly hosting unlawful content 
would remain, but at least then legislators would have a 
clear understanding about the right fix.
Twenty years after the Fourth Circuit panel announced 
it, we might expect that Zeran’s influence would wane, 
particularly in a market that is as dynamic as that for online 
applications. But the case remains an important authority 
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across jurisdictions, which is a credit to the persuasiveness 
of Judge Harvie Wilkinson’s opinion for the panel. It remains 
above all an important authority on the §230 objective to 
maintain the robust nature of communications online by 
minimizing government interference. All we need now is 
a judicial opinion or, likelier, a legislative enactment that 
better balances that important statutory objective with 
the original congressional intention to protect users from 
unlawful and materially harmful communicative acts online. 
Only then might we achieve a healthy and robust online 
environment for communication for everyone.
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CDA 230 Then and Now: 
Does Intermediary Immunity 
Keep the Rest of Us 
Healthy?
Twenty years after it was first litigated in 
earnest, the U.S. Communications Decency Act’s 
§230 remains both obscure and vital.
By Jonathan Zittrain
T
wenty years after it was first litigated in earnest, 
the U.S. Communications Decency Act’s §230 
remains both obscure and vital. Section 230 
nearly entirely eliminated the liability of Internet 
content platforms under state common law for 
bad acts, such as defamation, occasioned by their users. 
The platforms were free to structure their moderation and 
editing of comments as they pleased, without a traditional 
newspaper’s framework in which to undertake editing was 
to bear responsibility for what was published. If the New 
York Times included a letter to the editor that defamed 
someone, the Times would be vulnerable to a lawsuit (to be 
sure, so would the letter’s author, whose wallet size would 
likely make for a less tempting target). Not so for online 
content portals that welcome comments from anywhere—in-
cluding the online version of the New York Times.
This strange medium-specific subsidy for online con-
tent platforms made good if not perfect sense in 1996. (My 
generally positive thinking about it from that time, including 
some reservations, can be found here.) The Internet was 
newly mainstream, and many content portals comprised 
the proverbial two people in a garage. To impose upon them 
the burdens of traditional media would presumably require 
tough-to-maintain gatekeeping. Comments sections, if they 
remained at all, would have to be carefully screened to avoid 
creating liability for the company. What made sense for a 
newspaper publishing at most five or six letters a day amidst 
its more carefully vetted articles truly couldn’t work for a 
small Internet startup processing thousands or even millions 
of comments or other contributions in the same interval. 
Over time, the reviews elicited by Yelp and TripAdvisor, the 
financial markets discussions on Motley Fool, the evolving ar-
ticles on user-edited Wikipedia—all are arguably only possible 
thanks to that §230 immunity conferred in 1996.
The immunity conferred is so powerful that there’s not 
only a subsidy of digital over analog, but one for third-party 
commentary over one’s own—or that of one’s employees. Last 
year the notorious Gawker.com settled for $31 million after 
being successfully sued for publishing a two-minute extract 
of a private sex video. If Gawker, instead of employing a staff 
whose words (and video excerpts) were attributable to the 
company, had simply let any anonymous user post the same 
excerpt—and indeed worked to assure that that user’s ano-
nymity could not be pierced—it would be immune from an 
identical invasion of privacy suit thanks to the CDA. From this 
perspective, Gawker’s mistake wasn’t to host the video, but to 
have its own employees be the ones to post it.
The internet environment of 2017 is a lot different than 
that of 1997, and some of those two-people-in-a-garage ven-
tures are now among the most powerful and valuable compa-
nies in the world. So does it make sense to maintain §230’s 
immunities today?
    An infant industry has grown up.
In 1997, it made sense on a number of fronts to treat the 
Internet differently from its analog counterparts. For exam-
ple, there was debate from the earliest mainstreaming of 
Internet commerce about whether to make U.S. state sales 
tax collection apply to Internet-based faraway purchases. The 
fact that there was so little Internet commerce meant that 
there was not a lot of money foregone by failing to tax; that 
new companies (and, for that matter, existing ones) could try 
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out e-commerce models without concerning themselves 
from the start with tax compliance in multiple jurisdictions; 
and that the whole Internet sector could gather momentum 
if purchasers were enticed to go online—which in turn would 
further entice more commerce, and other activity, online. I 
was among those who therefore argued in favor of the de 
facto moratorium on state sales tax. But that differential no 
longer makes sense. A single online company—Amazon—now 
accounts for about 5 percent of all U.S. retail sales, online or 
off. It’s a good thing that Amazon’s physical expansion has 
meant that it naturally has started collecting and remitting 
state sales tax around the country.
Perhaps the evolution of the merits of equal treatment 
for state sales tax provides a good model for a refined CDA: 
companies below a certain size or activity threshold could 
benefit from its immunities, while those who grow large 
enough to facilitate the infliction of that much more dam-
age from defamatory and other actionable posts might also 
have the resources to employ a compliance department. 
That would militate towards at least some standard to meet 
in vetting or dealing with posts, perhaps akin to the light 
duties of booksellers or newsstands towards the wares they 
stock rather than the higher ones of newspapers towards 
the letters they publish.
Apart from the first-order drawback of an incentive to 
game the system by staying just under whatever size or ac-
tivity threshold triggers the new responsibilities, there’s also 
the question of noncommercial communities that can be-
come large without having traditional corporate hierarchies 
that lend themselves to direct legal accountability. Some 
of the most important computing services in the world rely 
on free and open source software, even as there remains a 
puzzle of how software liability would work when there’s no 
organized firm singly producing it. This puzzle has remained 
unsolved even today, since liability for bugs or vulnerabili-
ties in even corporate-authored software tends to be quite 
minimal. That might change as the line between hardware 
and software continues to blur with the Internet of Things.
Even for companies suited for new, light responsibilities 
under a modified CDA, there might be a distinction made 
between damages for past acts and duties for future ones. 
The toughest part of the Zeran case even for those sym-
pathetic to the CDA is that apparently AOL was repeatedly 
told that the scandalous advertisement purporting to be 
from Ken Zeran was in fact not at all related to him—and the 
company was in a comparatively good position to confirm 
that. Even then the company did nothing. It’s one thing to 
have permitted some defamatory content to come through 
amidst millions of messages; it’s another to be fully aware 
of it once it’s posted, and to still not be charged with any 
responsibility to deal with it. A more refined CDA might 
underscore such a distinction, favoring the kind of knowl-
edge of falsehood that’s at the heart of the heightened New 
York Times v. Sullivan barrier that public figures must meet 
in establishing defamation by a newspaper, and also cover 
knowledge that might come about after publication rather 
than before—leading only to responsibility once the knowl-
edge is gained and not timely acted upon.
The AI thicket.
Even massive online speech-mediating companies can 
only hire so many people. With thousands of staffers around 
the world apparently committed to reviewing complaints 
arising over Facebook posts, the company still relies on 
algorithms to sift helpful from unhelpful content. And here 
the distinction between pre- and post-publication becomes 
blurred, because services like Facebook and Twitter not only 
host content—as a newspaper website does by permitting 
comments to appear in sequence after an article—but they 
also help people navigate it. A post might reach ten people 
or a billion, depending on whether it’s placed in no news 
feeds or many.
The CDA as it stands allows maximum flexibility for 
salting feeds, since no liability will attach for spreading 
even otherwise-actionable content far and wide. A refined 
CDA could take into account the fact that Facebook and 
others know exactly whom they’ve reached: perhaps a more 
reasonable and fitting remedy for defamation would less be 
to assess damages against the company for having abetted 
it, but rather to require a correction or other followup to 
go out to those who saw—and perhaps came to believe—the 
defamatory content. (To be sure, this solution doesn’t work 
for other wrongs such as invasion of privacy; no correction 
can “uninvade” it among those who saw the content in 
question.)
Such corrective, rather than compensatory, remedies 
may be more fitting both for the wronged party and for the 
publisher, but it could in turn make content elision much 
more common. For example, in the context of traditional 
book publishing, including for noninteractive digital books 
like those within a Kindle, the CDA does not protect the 
publisher against the author’s defamation. With a threat of 
liability remaining, I’ve worried that in addition to damages, 
a litigant might demand a digital retraction: a forced release 
of a new version of an e-book to all e-readers that omits the 
defamatory content.
Of course, if the challenged words are really defam-
atory that might be thought of as an improvement for 
both injured party and for the reader. But if done without 
notice to the reader, it smacks of propaganda, and to the 
extent lawsuits or threats of same can induce defendant 
publishers to cave—when caving doesn’t entail paying 
out damages but rather altering the content they’ve 
stewarded—it could come to happen all too frequently, 
and with the wrong incentives. Similarly, an AI trained to 
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avoid controversial subjects—perhaps defined as subjects 
that could give rise to threats of litigation—might be 
very much against the public interest. This would mirror 
some of the damaging incentives of Europe’s “right to be 
forgotten” as developed against search engines. Any re-
finement of the CDA that could inspire AI-driven content 
shaping runs this risk, with the perverse solace that even 
with today’s CDA the major content platforms are already 
shaping content in ways that are not understandable or 
reviewable outside the companies.
Related to the power of AI is the refined power to per-
sonalize content in 2017, including by jurisdiction. If a Texas 
court finds something defamatory under Texas law, such as 
maligning certain food products, it might not be defamatory 
under, say, Massachusetts law. Any diminution of CDA 230’s 
immunities might in the first order impel online platforms 
like Facebook to have to police away any food disparage-
ment—even if it’s posted and read by Facebook users in 
food-indifferent Massachusetts. If there were to be exposure 
under Texas law, perhaps it should only arise if the content 
were shown (or continued to be shown) in Texas. This could 
also provide a helpful set of pressures on the substantive 
doctrine: Texas citizens, including legislators, might rue 
being excluded from certain content online that’s available 
in other states.
The internet’s development over the past twenty 
years has benefited immeasurably from the immunities 
conferred by §230. We’ve been lucky to have it. But any 
honest account must acknowledge the collateral damage 
it has permitted to be visited upon real people whose 
reputations, privacy, and dignity have been hurt in ways 
that defy redress. Especially as that damage becomes 
more systematized—now part of organized campaigns to 
shame people into silence online for expressing opinions 
that don’t fit an aggressor’s propaganda aims—platforms’ 
failures to moderate become more costly, both to targets 
of harassment and to everyone else denied exposure to 
honestly-held ideas.
As our technologies for sifting and disseminating 
content evolve, and our content intermediaries trend 
towards increasing power and centralization, there are 
narrow circumstances where a path to accountability for 
those intermediaries for the behavior of their users might 
be explored. Incrementalism gets a bad rap, but it’s right to 
proceed slowly if at all here, with any tweaks subject to rig-
orous review of how they impact the environment. The vice 
from the indiscriminate nature of §230’s broad immunity is 
somewhat balanced by a virtue of everyone knowing exactly 
where matters stand—line-drawing carries its own costs and 
distortions.
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